Women and Justice: Topics: Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Property and inheritance rights

These articles determine the legal consequences related to joint property of the spouses after the dissolution of the marriage. Dissolution of marriage shall not terminate the joint ownership of any property acquired in marriage, meaning that co-owners shall manage any property that remains in their joint ownership upon divorce only on the basis of their mutual agreement. However, the Family Code protects the rights of divorced spouses: (i) they can agree to divide ownership of the joint property or (ii) apply to the court to the divide the joint property after the dissolution of the marriage. As a general rule, any joint property must be allotted to the spouses in equal shares unless otherwise agreed or contracted. However, in determining the division of joint property, the court may divert from the rule of equal shares in the light of any vital circumstances, such as either spouse was not contributing to the family maintenance, concealed assets, eliminated or caused damage to any joint assets, or used any joint assets in a way that was detrimental to the family interests. Children living with one of the spouses in itself is not a reason for increasing the share in the property of one of the spouses.

Ці статті визначають правові наслідки щодо спільного майна подружжя після розірвання шлюбу. Розірвання шлюбу не припиняє право спільної власності на будь-яке майно, набуте в шлюбі, тобто співвласники розпоряджаються майном, яке залишається в їхній спільній власності після розірвання шлюбу, лише за взаємною згодою. Проте, Сімейний кодекс захищає права розлученого подружжя: (I) вони можуть домовитися про поділ спільного майна або (II) звернутися до суду з позовом про поділ спільного майна після розірвання шлюбу. За загальним правилом будь-яке спільне майно подружжя має бути розподілене між подружжям у рівних частках, якщо інше не встановлено домовленістю чи договором. Однак, вирішуючи питання про поділ спільного майна, суд може відхилитися від правила рівних часток у світлі будь-яких життєво важливих обставин, наприклад, якщо будь-хто з подружжя не брав участі в утриманні сім’ї, приховував активи, знищив або завдав шкоди будь-якому спільному майну або використовував будь-які спільні активи у спосіб, який завдавав шкоди інтересам сім’ї. Саме по собі проживання дітей з одним із подружжя не є підставою для збільшення частки у майні одного з подружжя.

Article 57 of the Family Code of Ukraine defines a list of types of property that are not considered joint property of spouses, for example: (i) any property acquired by either spouse before getting married; (ii) any property acquired under a gift agreement or as heritage during the marriage; (iii) any property acquired during marriage with one spouse’s own money; (iv) personal items such as jewelry, even if acquired with money owned jointly by the spouses, etc. However, according to Ukrainian legislation and judicial practice, there is a presumption of joint spousal ownership: it is assumed that all property of the spouses is their joint property and subject to division, until proven otherwise. When deciding whether property belongs to both spouses, Ukrainian courts are guided by criteria including the time of acquisition of the property and the funds with which such property was acquired (source of acquisition). For example, if property was acquired with personal funds during the marriage, the property is not joint property of the spouses, but rather is the personal private property of the spouse who purchased it. At the same time, if it is not confirmed that the property was bought with personal funds, the presumption of joint ownership of the spouses will remain. The spouse contesting the claim that the property is individual property bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of joint. When managing property, Article 59 requires that spouses must consider the interests of the child and other family members who are lawfully authorized to use their property.

Стаття 57 Сімейного кодексу України визначає перелік видів майна, яке не є спільною сумісною власністю подружжя, наприклад: (I) будь-яке майно, набуте одним із подружжя до шлюбу; (II) будь-яке майно, набуте за договором дарування або в порядку спадкування; (III) будь-яке майно, придбане під час шлюбу за особисті кошти одного з подружжя; (IV) особисті речі, такі як ювелірні вироби, навіть якщо вони придбані за кошти, які є спільною власністю подружжя, тощо. Однак, згідно з українським законодавством та судовою практикою, існує презумпція спільної власності подружжя: вважається, що все майно подружжя є їхньою спільною власністю і підлягає поділу, доки не буде доведено інше. Вирішуючи питання про належність майна обом подружжю, українські суди керуються такими критеріями, як час набуття майна та кошти, на які таке майно набуто (джерело набуття). Наприклад, якщо майно було придбано за особисті кошти під час шлюбу, це майно не є спільною власністю подружжя, а є особистою приватною власністю того з подружжя, який його придбав. При цьому, якщо не буде підтверджено факт придбання майна за особисті кошти, презумпція спільної власності подружжя збережеться. Той з подружжя, який заперечує вимогу про те, що майно є індивідуальною власністю, несе тягар спростування презумпції спільної власності. Стаття 59 вимагає, щоб подружжя при управлінні майном зважало на інтереси дитини та інших членів сім’ї, які за законом мають право користуватися їх майном.

Spouses who have children may file to a competent court a divorce application supported by a written agreement detailing with whom the children will live following the divorce, to what extent the other parent will support the children, and the other parent's right to care for the children. The competent court shall award a divorce one month following the submission of the divorce application, if it is established that the divorce application is in line with the genuine intent of the wife and husband. It is interesting that the family law establishes rules according to which the court shall attempt to facilitate the reunification of the couple through measures that are not in conflict with the moral principles of society (in such circumstances, the court may suspend the proceedings and set a time limit for the spouses to reconcile, which may not exceed six months). If both spouses agree to dissolve the marriage, the terms for reconciliation are usually not set by the court. Either spouse may apply for a divorce. At the same time, the legislature limited access to justice to certain categories of persons, namely: pregnant wives and their husbands, as well as parents of children under one year of age. Thus, a divorce application may not be filed during the wife's pregnancy and within one year of childbirth, unless either spouse engages in illegal behavior that may be classified as a criminal offense against the other spouse or the child. Such a limitation does not typically preserve the family, and may interfere with a person's right to marry another person with whom they already live, affects decision-making regarding the acquisition of property, because in this case it will be considered joint property (it will be very difficult for a person to challenge the presumption of joint property in court even if the persons do not live together). When deciding the issue of divorce, the court shall investigate the actual relationship of the spouse and genuine grounds for filing for divorce, with due regard to whether the spouses have a minor child or any other important factors. After divorce, a person has the right to revert their pre-marriage last name. In case of divorce granted by the court, the marriage shall be deemed terminated as of the effective date of the court judgment awarding the divorce.

Подружжя, яке має дітей, може подати до компетентного суду заяву про розірвання шлюбу, яка супроводжується письмовою угодою, в якій вказується, з ким проживатимуть діти після розірвання шлюбу, в якому обсязі другий з батьків утримуватиме дітей, а також право другого з батьків піклуватися про дітей. Компетентний суд ухвалює рішення про розірвання шлюбу через місяць після подання заяви про розірвання шлюбу, якщо буде встановлено, що заява про розірвання шлюбу відповідає справжнім намірам дружини та чоловіка. Цікаво, що сімейне законодавство встановлює правила, відповідно до яких суд намагається сприяти возз’єднанню подружжя за допомогою заходів, які не суперечать моральним засадам суспільства (за таких обставин суд може призупинити провадження та призначити строк для примирення подружжя, який не може перевищувати шести місяців). У разі згоди обох з подружжя на розірвання шлюбу строк примирення судом зазвичай не встановлюються. Будь-хто з подружжя може подати заяву на розірвання шлюбу. Водночас законодавець обмежив доступ до правосуддя певним категоріям осіб, а саме: вагітним дружинам та їхнім чоловікам, а також батькам дітей віком до одного року. Таким чином, заява про розірвання шлюбу не може бути подана під час вагітності дружини та протягом одного року після пологів, за винятком випадків, коли будь-хто з подружжя вчинив протиправну поведінку, яка може бути кваліфікована як кримінальний злочин щодо іншого з подружжя або дитини. Таке обмеження, як правило, не зберігає сім’ю, може перешкоджати праву особи на шлюб з іншою особою, з якою вони вже проживають, впливати на прийняття рішення щодо придбання майна, оскільки в цьому випадку воно вважатиметься спільною власністю (вкрай важко оскаржити презумпцію спільної власності в суді, навіть якщо особи не проживають разом). При вирішенні питання про розірвання шлюбу суд з'ясовує фактичні стосунки подружжя та дійсні підстави для звернення до суду з позовом про розірвання шлюбу, з урахуванням наявності у подружжя неповнолітньої дитини та інших важливих обставин. Після розірвання шлюбу особа має право повернути своє дошлюбне прізвище. У разі розірвання шлюбу за рішенням суду шлюб вважається припиненим з дня набрання законної сили рішенням суду про розірвання шлюбу.

Termination of marriage is a legal status, after which the legal relationship between the spouses no longer exists. Articles 104-105 of the Family Code of Ukraine provide that a marriage is terminated if either spouse is presumed dead or declared missing. Dissolution is one of the types of termination of marriage provided by the Family Code. Dissolution can take place via in-court and out-of-court procedure, namely: (i) upon application to the civil registration office for divorce filed by (a) both spouses (if spouses do not have children) or (b) only one of spouse (if the second spouse has been declared missing or incapacitated); (ii) upon successful application to a competent court from spouses who have children; (iii) upon the application of one of the spouses. These articles reflect the principle of “voluntary marriage,” which requires free and complete consent not only at the time of marriage registration, but also during marriage and its subsequent dissolution. No one can be forced to stay in a marriage. A simple unwillingness to continue being married to a certain person is enough, even in the absence of conflicts, quarrels, etc.

Припинення шлюбу є правовим станом, після якого правовідносини між подружжям перестають існувати. Статтями 104-105 Сімейного кодексу України передбачено, що шлюб припиняється у разі визнання одного з подружжя померлим або безвісно відсутнім. Розірвання шлюбу є одним із видів припинення шлюбу, передбачених Сімейним кодексом. Розірвання шлюбу може відбутися в судовому та позасудовому порядку, а саме: (I) за заявою до відділу реєстрації актів цивільного стану про розлучення, поданою (а) обома подружжям (якщо подружжя не має дітей) або (б) лише одним із подружжя (якщо другий з подружжя визнано безвісно відсутнім або недієздатним); (II) після успішного звернення до компетентного суда від подружжя, яке має дітей; (III) за заявою одного з подружжя. У цих статтях відображено принцип "добровільності шлюбу", який вимагає вільної та повної згоди не лише під час реєстрації шлюбу, але й під час шлюбу та його подальшого розірвання. Нікого не можна змусити залишатися в шлюбі. Досить простого небажання продовжувати перебування в шлюбі з певною людиною, навіть за відсутності конфліктів, сварок і т.

The 38th Amendment of the Irish Constitution (available here) (i) repealed a previous requirement under Article 41(3) for a period of separation before dissolution of a marriage and (ii) added that the law must provide for the recognition of a dissolution of a marriage granted under the civil law of another state.

Article 22 modified the French Civil Code, establishing a new civil law for eviction of a violent spouse from the matrimonial home. Specifically, the law amended the French Civil Code to provide that, where a violent spouse puts their spouse or children in danger, the judge may order separate residence, indicating which spouse may continue to live in the matrimonial home. Absent special circumstances, it is the violent spouse who should be ordered to leave the matrimonial home.

Article 22 modifie le Code Civil français, en établissant une nouvelle loi civile par rapport à l’expulsion d’un conjoint violent du logement conjugal. En particulier, la loi modifie le Code Civil Français, pour donner le droit à un juge de préciser que si un des conjoints est violent et met l’autre conjoint ou les enfants en danger, le juge peut avoir le pouvoir de déclarer que seul un des conjoints puisse continuer à vivre dans la maison conjugale. Absent des circonstances particulières, c’est toujours le conjoint violent qui devra être ordonné de partir du logement conjugal.

Under the Civil Code, same-sex marriages are prohibited. In case of a divorce by mutual consent, the marriage can be dissolved if over a year has elapsed, the spouses have made a contract regarding divorce consequences, and they have full active legal capacity. If a couple has children, they have equal rights and duties as parents, regardless of whether they were married, divorced, or separated. A parent cannot surrender their rights or responsibilities over underage children. An unmarried person can adopt a child only in exceptional cases, and unmarried persons may not adopt the same child. In addition, the adopter must be under the age of 50. Moreover, the Code states that an unmarried adult can change their designated gender if it is feasible medically with conditions for the change prescribed by law. Essential to mention, there is no existing legislation setting out the requirements for gender reassignment (see L. v. Lithuania, even though the case is from 2007, legislation efforts have been stalled to this day). English translation available here.

Pagal civilinį kodeksą tos pačios lyties asmenų santuokos yra draudžiamos. Santuoka gali būti nutraukta bendru sutarimu, jei praėjo daugiau nei metai, sutuoktiniai sudarė sutartį dėl santuokos nutraukimo pasekmių ir jie turi teisinį veiksnumą. Jei pora turi vaikų, jie turi lygias teises ir pareigas kaip tėvai, nepriklausomai nuo to, ar jie susituokę, išsiskyrę ar gyvena skyrium. Tėvas ar motina negali atsisakyti teisių ar pareigų savo nepilnamečiams vaikams. Nesusituokęs asmuo gali įvaikinti vaiką tik išimtiniais atvejais, o nesusituokę asmenys negali įvaikinti to paties vaiko. Be to, įvaikintojas turi būti jaunesnis nei 50 metų. Taip pat, kodekse nustatyta, kad nesusituokęs suaugęs asmuo gali pakeisti paskirtą lytį, jei tai įmanoma mediciniškai, įstatymų nustatyta tvarka. Svarbu paminėti, kad iki šiol nėra galiojančių teisės aktų, nustatančių lyties keitimo sąlygas (žr. L prieš Lietuvą).

Under Art. 20, spouses decide on issues related to their marriage and family relations jointly, by mutual agreement, and on the basis of equality. The relationship between the spouses must be based on mutual respect, assistance, and fair distribution of responsibilities. Spouses also have the right to resolve issues related to their personal interests independently. Spouses may choose any of their last names, a double last name, or leave their last name unchanged at their individual discretion in accordance with Art. 21. Both spouses are free to choose their occupation, profession, and place of residence in accordance with Art. 22. Under Art. 23, all property acquired during a marriage, even if one of the spouses did not have independent income during the time of the marriage due to being engaged in housekeeping or childcare, is the common joint property of the spouses. Both spouses have equal rights to the possession, use, and disposal of such property. However, property belonging to one spouse before marriage and property received during marriage by gift or inheritance remains the property of that spouse in accordance with Art. 26. In the event of division of the common joint property of the spouses, the property is divided equally in accordance with Art. 24.

The law defines matrimonial and family relationships and sets out protections of mothers’ and children’s interests in family life and upon divorce. The law establishes that men and women have equal rights in all aspects pertaining to family relationships and have freedom to marry upon reaching the age of marriage. The law provides that marriage should be entered into on the basis of mutual consent. The law prohibits various forms of discrimination against women, such as through polygamy, unequal use of matrimonial properties during a marriage, and unlawful division of matrimonial properties upon divorce. The law states that husband and wife have right to engage in political, economic, cultural, and social activities. It further provides that both husband and wife have joint right to choose place of residence and the respective right to select family name. The law also sets out provisions for divorce. In case of divorce, the Court may order a former husband to pay child support; and when his former wife is sick and unable to meet her own needs, the Court may also order a former husband to pay alimony for a period which shall be less than one year.

Article 638 defines parental responsibility as the set of parental duties and rights relating to the person and property of the children for the children’s protection, development, and education while they are minors. These responsibilities are governed by three principles set out in article 639: a) the best interests of the child; b) the progressive autonomy of the child based on his or her psychophysical characteristics, aptitudes, and development. With greater autonomy, the representation of the parents in the exercise of the rights of the children diminishes; c) the right of the child to be heard and to have his or her opinion considered based on his or her age and degree of maturity. In the event of a disagreement between parents, article 642 permits either parent to seek relief from a competent judge. The judge must resolve the disagreement through the shortest mechanism provided by local law, after hearing the parents in conjunction with a public prosecutor. If the disagreements continue or if any other disagreement occurs that seriously obstructs the exercise of parental responsibility, the judge may: (1) assign parental responsibility in whole or in part to one of the parents, or (2) distribute their duties among them, for a period not exceeding two years. The judge may also order interdisciplinary intervention measures and submit the disagreement for mediation. Article 646 states that the duties of the parents are to: a) take care of and live with the child, provide food and education; b) consider the specific needs of the child according to his or her psychophysical characteristics, aptitudes and development; c) respect the right of children and adolescents to be heard and to participate in their own educational process, as well as in all matters related to their personal rights; d) provide guidance and direction to the child for the exercise and effectiveness of his or her rights; e) respect and facilitate the right of the child to maintain personal relationships with grandparents, other relatives or persons with whom he or she has an affective bond; f) represent and manage the child's estate. Article 647 prohibits corporal punishment in any form, mistreatment, and any act that physically or psychologically harms children or adolescents. Article 654 requires that each parent inform the other about the education, health, and other issues related to the child's person and assets.

El artículo 638 define la responsabilidad parental como el conjunto de deberes y derechos parentales relacionados con la persona y los bienes de los niños para la protección, el desarrollo y la educación de los niños mientras sean menores. Estas responsabilidades se rigen por tres principios establecidos en el artículo 639: a) el interés superior del niño; b) la progresiva autonomía del niño en función de sus características psicofísicas, aptitudes y desarrollo. Con mayor autonomía, disminuye la representación de los padres en el ejercicio de los derechos de los hijos; c) el derecho del niño a ser escuchado y a que se tenga en cuenta su opinión en función de su edad y grado de madurez. En caso de desacuerdo entre los padres, el artículo 642 permite que cualquiera de los padres busque alivio ante un juez competente. El juez debe resolver el desacuerdo a través del mecanismo más corto provisto por la ley local, después de escuchar a los padres en conjunto con un fiscal. Si los desacuerdos continúan o si se produce cualquier otro desacuerdo que obstaculice gravemente el ejercicio de la patria potestad, el juez podrá: (1) ceder la patria potestad total o parcialmente a uno de los padres, o (2) repartir sus deberes entre ellos, por un período no superior a dos años. El juez también podrá ordenar medidas de intervención interdisciplinaria y someter la disconformidad a mediación. El artículo 646 establece que los deberes de los padres son: a) cuidar y convivir con el niño, proporcionarle alimentación y educación; b) considerar las necesidades específicas del niño de acuerdo con sus características psicofísicas, aptitudes y desarrollo; c) respetar el derecho de los niños, niñas y adolescentes a ser escuchados y participar en su propio proceso educativo, así como en todo lo relacionado con sus derechos personales; d) brindar orientación y dirección al niño para el ejercicio y efectividad de sus derechos; e) respetar y facilitar el derecho del niño a mantener relaciones personales con los abuelos, otros familiares o personas con las que tenga un vínculo afectivo; f) representar y administrar la herencia del niño. El artículo 647 prohíbe el castigo corporal en cualquier forma, el maltrato y cualquier acto que lesione física o psicológicamente a los niños o adolescentes. El artículo 654 requiere que cada padre informe al otro sobre la educación, la salud y otros asuntos relacionados con la persona y los bienes del niño.

This Act relates to divorce, nullity of marriages, and child custody. According to Section 1, a petition for divorce will only be granted if the “marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation,” which includes adultery, unreasonable behavior, desertion, and unreconcilable differences. The petition may be filed by either party. Part 2 discusses other matrimonial issues, such as nullity of marriage, presumption of death, and neglect. Finally, Part 3 outlines the Court’s power to split property between the parties and decide child custody. To that end, the Court can issue restraining orders to prevent one party from leaving the jurisdiction or removing a child of the household from the jurisdiction.

Chapter 16 sets forth criminal offenses for conduct against the family. §16.3 provides that an abortion after 24 weeks of pregnancy is a felony, unless it is conducted by a licensed physician upon his belief that the pregnancy causes danger to the mother or the child would be born with a grave defect. §16.1-16.2 prohibits bigamy, polygamy, incest, or deviate sexual intercourse with a family member and designates these acts as felonies. Separately, the Law prohibits harassment, which is defined as a written threat, an offensive telephone call, or repeated telephone calls with no legitimate communication purpose with the intent to frighten or harass the recipient. Chapter 14 Subchapter D outlines crimes involving sexual violence against persons committed on or after January 17, 2006. The age for statutory rape is 18 years. Gang rape constitutes first-degree felony. The Law defines lack of “consent” as including violence or the threat of violence against the victim or another person, the victim’s unconsciousness, a physical disability that prevents the victim from being able to to communicate his or her consent, or intentionally forcing the victim’s consent. The following acts constitute first-degree rape: rape of an underage victim, gang rape, rape that results in permanent disability to the victim, and use of a deadly weapon. The maximum punishment for first-degree rape is life imprisonment, and the maximum punishment for second-degree rape is 10 years imprisonment. Chapter 14 Subchapter D also covers sexual violence crimes committed before January 17, 2006. For those earlier offenses, the following constitute rape: a male has sexual intercourse with a female that is not his wife by force or by impairing her power to control her conduct; or a male has sexual intercourse with a female less than 16 years old. First-degree rape includes the following: the defendant causes serious bodily injury to the victim, the defendant has sexual intercourse with a female under 16 years of age, or the defendant has sexual intercourse with a female who has not previously consented. The change of language regarding crimes committed after 2006 indicates several important gender-related developments. First, the new language explicitly allows for the prosecution of men and women as perpetrators of rape. Second, it allows for the prosecution of rapes of male victims. Third, it no longer exempts “marital rape” from prosecution. Finally, it raises the age of statutory rape from 16 to 18 years. However, the Law also criminalizes homosexuality, making “voluntary sodomy” a misdemeanor (chapter 14.74).

Article 7 of the Constitution of Kosovo states that Kosovo’s constitutional order is based on principles including equality, respect for human rights, non-discrimination, and social justice. The article further declares that Kosovo ensures gender equality as a fundamental value for the democratic development of the society, providing equal opportunities for both female and male participation in the political, economic, social, cultural, and other areas of societal life. Article 24(2) prohibits discrimination on grounds of gender and sexual orientation. Article 28(1) stipulates that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude, and paragraph (3) specifically forbids trafficking in persons. Article 37 declares that everyone enjoys the right to marry based on free will. It mandates that marriage and divorce be based on the equality of spouses. Article 71(2) stipulates that the composition of the Assembly of Kosovo shall respect internationally recognized principles of gender equality. Article 101(1) stipulates that the composition of the civil service shall take into account internationally recognized principles of gender equality. Article 104(2) stipulates that the composition of the judiciary shall reflect internationally recognized principles of gender equality. Article 108(2) charges the Kosovo Judicial Council to ensure that the Kosovo courts follow the principles of gender equality. Paragraph (4) requires proposals for appointment of judges to reflect principles of gender equality. Article 109(4) stipulates the State Prosecutor shall respect the principles of gender equality. Article 110(1) charges the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council to ensure that the State Prosecutor reflects the principles of gender equality. Paragraph (2) requires that proposals for appointments of prosecutors shall reflect principles of gender equality. Article 114(1) requires the composition of the Constitutional Court to respect principles of gender equality. (Unofficial English translation available here.)

The Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance covers the kinds of ancillary and other relief that may be granted in matrimonial proceedings. Sections 4-7 of the Ordinance, in particular, cover the allocation of assets between a divorcing couple.

The Matrimonial Causes Act governs marriages, dissolution of marriage, and custody of children. According to Section 5(d) a marriage is voidable if at the time of marriage “the wife is pregnant by a person other than the husband.” However, by Section 35(c), only the husband can nullify the marriage because of pregnancy; the wife has no right to petition to do so. Under Section 47, both husband and wife have grounds for a decree of restitution of conjugal rights, if either refuse to cohabitate with and render conjugal rights to the other. With respect to the wife, if the husband has paid any money to her with respect to a decree under Section 47 and she refuses to comply with the decree within a reasonable time, the money paid becomes a debt due and payable by the wife to the husband and recoverable by action in court.

Article 21 of the Constitution of Republic of Uganda prohibits gender discrimination generally and enshrines the principle of equality before the law, regardless of sex, race, color, ethnicity, tribe, religion, political belief, or social or economic standing. Article 31 sets the minimum age for marriage at 18 and provides for equal rights between men and women during marriage and divorce. Article 33 pertains specifically to the rights of women and requires that (1) the government must provide opportunities to enhance the welfare of women and enable them to reach their full potential, (2) women have rights equal to men in areas including political, economic, and social activities, and (3) laws, customs, traditions, and cultures that are "against the dignity of women" are prohibited by the Constitution. Article 22 enshrines protection for the right to life and allows for abortion in accordance with the law.

The law defines family relationships and establishes certain “rights of the family.” The law prohibits various forms of discrimination against women, including through polygamy, inheritance, age at marriage and choice of children. The law defines marriage as a “voluntary union between a man and a woman”, which requires mutual consent. Coerced marriage is subject to annulment. The law provides that both husband and wife have the right to “represent the family”, to administer the family finances, and to work. The law also outlines provisions for divorce. Husbands are required to pay child support in case of divorce,

Section 4AB defines family violence, covering within its scope violent, threatening or other behavior by a person that coerces or controls a member of the family or causes that member to be fearful. Further, 4AB(2) sets out a list of behaviors that may constitute family violence, including assault, stalking, repeated derogatory taunts, intentionally damaging or destroying property, and unreasonably withholding financial support. The Act provides for divorce and nullity of marriage if the marriage has broken down irreparably. Furthermore, section 65AA deals with parental orders. The court must, pursuant to section 60CG, facilitate the child’s best interest but also to the extent possible ensure that any parental order is consistent with any family violence order and does not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence.

The Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China was adopted by the National People’s Congress on September 10, 1980 and amended on April 28, 2001. Article 2 provides that the marriage system is “based on the free choice of partners, on monogamy and on equality between man and woman.” Article 3 prohibits interference by a third party, mercenary marriage and exaction of money or gifts in connection with marriage. Article 6 provides the minimal marriage age is twenty-two for men and twenty for women. Article 13 provides that husband and wife shall have equal status in the family. Article 34 provides that “a husband may not apply for a divorce when his wife is pregnant, or within one year after the birth of the child, or within six months after the termination of her gestation.” Article 43 provides that neighborhood committee, villagers committee or the unit[1] to which the family belongs have an obligation to deter domestic violence. English version available here.

离婚、家庭暴力、包办婚姻与早婚、性别歧视

本法于1980年9月10日第五届全国人民代表大会通过，于2001年4月28日修正。第二条规定中国实行婚姻自由、一夫一妻、男女平等的婚姻制度。第六条禁止包办、买卖婚姻和其他干涉婚姻自由的行为，禁止借婚姻索取财物。第六条规定结婚年龄，男不得早于二十二周岁，女不得早于二十周岁。第十三条规定夫妻在家庭中地位平等。第三十四条规定女方在怀孕期间、分娩后一年内或中止妊娠后六个月内，男方不得提出离婚。第四十三条规定居民委员会、村民委员会以及所在单位应当予以劝阻、调解家庭暴力。

[1] “Unit” is a term of art with strong communist connotations, which refers to the company/organization/group to which a person belongs.

The determination of the nature, amount, and duration of alimony is based on the court’s weighing of several factors. Among the factors considered by the court in its alimony determination are the following: (1) the relative earnings of the parties; (2) the ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of the parties; (3) the sources of income of both parties, including, but not limited to, medical, retirement, insurance, or other benefits; (4) the expectancies and inheritances of the parties; (5) the duration of the marriage; (6) the contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased earning power of the other party; (7) the extent to which the earning power, expenses or financial obligations of a party will be affected by reason of serving as the custodian of a minor child; (8) the standard of living of the parties established during the marriage; (9) the relative education of the parties and the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking alimony to find appropriate employment; (10) the relative assets and liabilities of the parties; (11) the property brought to the marriage by either party; (12) the contribution of a spouse as homemaker; (13) the relative needs of the parties; (14) the marital misconduct of either of the parties during the marriage; (15) the Federal, State, and local tax ramifications of the alimony award; (16) whether the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient property, including, but not limited to, property distributed under Chapter 35 to provide for the party’s reasonable needs; and (17) whether the party seeking alimony is incapable of self-support through appropriate employment.

Pennsylvania is an equitable distribution state, which means the court will “equitably and fairly” divide, distribute, or assign the marital property between the parties, regardless of marital misconduct. “Marital property” generally means all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage. All property acquired by a spouse during their marriage is presumed to be marital property regardless of how title is held. In making its “equitable and fair” division of marital property, the court will weigh numerous factors, which include: the length of the marriage; any prior marriage of either party; the age, health, station, amount, and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties; the contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased earning power of the other party; the opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets and income; the sources of income of both parties, including, but not limited to, medical, retirement, insurance, or other benefits; the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the contribution of a party as homemaker; the value of the property set apart to each party; the standard of living of the parties established during the marriage; the economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of property is to become effective; the federal, state and local tax ramifications associated with each asset to be divided, distributed or assigned; the expense of sale, transfer, or liquidation associated with a particular asset; and whether the party will be serving as the custodian of any dependent minor child(ren).

The Maintenance Act (the “Act”) imposes equal rights and burdens in relation to the payment of child support (and enforcement of child support orders) on both parents and abolishes customary laws to the contrary. The Act also states that husbands and wives are equally responsible for each other’s maintenance.

The Constitution serves as the fundamental law of Namibia and establishes the Republic of Namibia as an independent, secular, democratic, and unitary state safeguarding the rights to justice, liberty, dignity, and equality. Chapter 3 of the Constitution protects fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to equality and freedom from discrimination, including on the grounds of sex. It also bans child marriages and mandates equal rights for men and women entering into marriage, during the marriage, and at the dissolution of the marriage. Additionally, Parliament may not make any laws that contravene the Constitution, nor can the Executive take any action that abolishes or contravenes Chapter 3 of the Constitution. Any such laws or actions would be invalid.

This law sets the legal age of marriage without parental consent at 21 years of age. With parental consent, girls may marry at age 16 and men may marry at age 19. Marriages under the legal age are void and there are penalties for knowingly entering into or authorizing child or early marriage. The law also sets the requirements for polygamy, which include the first wife’s inability to fulfill her spousal duties (e.g., bearing children), the permission of the man’s current wife or wives, permission from the local Court, and proof that the man will treat all of his wives and children fairly and provide for them equally. Women are prohibited from marrying a second husband. The law also provides the conditions for the cancellation (annulments and divorce) of a marriage, the obligations of husbands and wives, property rights of spouses, the obligations of parents to their children, the legitimacy of children, the requirements of guardianship, foreign marriages, and the children of mixed-religion marriages.

The Families and Children Act governs the rights of a child, legal capacity and disabilities of children, guardianship and custody of children, status of children, support of children by government, maintenance rights and duties of members of the family as between themselves, maintenance of persons in public institutions, maintenance during divorce, separation or nullity, parentage of children, care and protection of children, foster-care, approved children homes, adoption, and the establishment of the National Committee for Families and Children.

Article 9 of the FDRE Constitution provides that all international treaties ratified by Ethiopia are integral parts of the law of the land. Similarly, Article 13.2 provides that fundamental rights and freedoms shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights and International instruments adopted by Ethiopia. Ethiopia has ratified many of these treaties including ICCPR, ICESCR, and CEDAW. Article 35 of the FDRE Constitution pertains to the Rights of Women. The article provides for equal rights under the constitution, equal rights with men in marriage, entitlement to affirmative measures, protection from harmful traditional practices, the right to maternity pay, the right to consultation, property rights (including acquiring and controlling and transferring property), employment rights, and access to family planning education. It is worth noting that this article explicitly imposes an obligation and accountability on the state to protect women from violence at Article 35.4: “The State shall enforce the right of women to eliminate the influences of harmful customs. Laws, customs and practices that oppress or cause bodily or mental harm to women are prohibited.”

Article 147 of the Islamic Penal Code specifies that the age of maturity triggering criminal responsibility is 15 Islamic lunar calendar years for boys, but only nine Islamic lunar calendar years for girls. This signifies that young girls can be charged as criminally responsible adults in Iran before they reach the age of puberty. Articles 237-239 forbid same-sex kissing and touching, which will be punished by 31-74 lashes. Female genital touching (musaheqeh) is punished by 100 lashes. Article 225 mandates the death penalty for adultery (zina), which international commentators have noted is disproportionately applied to women (e.g., UN Special Rapporteur for Violence Against Women report: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/A-68-340.pdf). Article 199 describes the number and gender of witnesses needed to prove various crimes; no crimes may be proven with female witnesses alone and any female witness requires corroboration of a man and another woman. (Full Persian version of the Penal Code available at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=103202)

The HMD Act regulates Hindu (including Jain and Sikh) marriages and codifies the specific requirements of these marriages and divorces.

The appellant sued his ex-wife, the respondent, regarding the division of property acquired during the marriage as the ex-spouses’ joint property. The appellant noted that during their marriage, the spouses accumulated funds that were kept in the respondent’s bank account. However, immediately after the divorce, the respondent independently managed the funds and bought an apartment. The appellant’s main argument was that, according to Ukrainian family law, the dissolution of marriage does not terminate the right of joint co-ownership of property acquired during the marriage. When the spouses’ jointly owned property is divided, each spouse shall receive an equal share, unless otherwise envisaged by the marriage contract. Thus, the appellant argued that half of the money belonged to him. The respondent claimed that the money was her private property because it was a gift from her friend from the Slovak Republic. The first-instance court satisfied the appellant’s claim, noting that, according to Ukrainian legislation, the deed of gift agreement should have been, but was not, notarized, rendering it null and void. Consequently, the money was the joint property of the spouses. The Court of Appeal overturned this decision. The Supreme Court also supported the position that the court of first instance erroneously satisfied the husband's claim because, as a gift from a citizen of the Slovak Republic, the Ukrainian courts should apply Slovak law, which does not require notarization of the deed of gift agreement. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the money was the woman's personal property and could not be divided.

Скаржник звернувся до суду з позовом до своєї колишньої дружини (відповідача) про поділ майна, нажитого за час шлюбу як спільної сумісної власності подружжя. Скаржник зазначив, що за час шлюбу подружжя накопичило кошти, які зберігалися на банківському рахунку відповідача. Проте, одразу після розірвання шлюбу, відповідач самостійно розпорядилась коштами та придбала квартиру. Основним аргументом скаржника було те, що відповідно до сімейного законодавства України розірвання шлюбу не припиняє права спільної сумісної власності на майно, набуте за час шлюбу. При поділі майна, що є спільною сумісною власністю подружжя, вважається, що частки кожного із подружжя є рівними, якщо інше не встановлено домовленістю між ними або договором. Таким чином, скаржник стверджував, що половина грошей належить йому. Відповідач стверджувала, що гроші є її приватною власністю, оскільки це подарунок її друга із Словацької Республіки. Суд першої інстанції задовольнив позов скаржника, зазначивши, що відповідно до законодавства України договір дарування мав бути (проте не був) нотаріально посвідчений, що робить його нікчемним. Отже, гроші були спільною власністю подружжя. Апеляційний суд скасував це рішення. Верховний Суд також підтримав позицію про те, що суд першої інстанції помилково задовольнив позов чоловіка, оскільки щодо подарунку громадянина Словацької Республіки українські суди мають застосовувати законодавство Словаччини, яке не вимагає нотаріального посвідчення договору дарування. Таким чином, Верховний суд дійшов висновку, що гроші є особистою власністю жінки і не підлягають розподілу.

The plaintiff requested that the court grant his divorce from his wife, the respondent. He argued that their married life had ended. After the respondent took the children and his property and left him in 2014, she lived separately from plaintiff, did not have marital relations with him, nor run a joint household with him. The first-instance court granted the divorce and concluded that the family had broken up and continuing the marriage was against everyone’s interests. The Court of Appeal left the decision of the first instance unchanged. The respondent insisted on preserving the marriage and filed the cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, claiming that the courts of previous instances had no right to interfere in her relationship with her husband. The Family Code of Ukraine allows either spouse to terminate the marriage. Forcing the termination or continuation of marriage, or forcing sex through physical or psychological violence, is an abuse of the right of the wife or husband to freedom and personal inviolability and may have additional legal implications. Therefore, the courts must determine the actual spousal relationship and any valid reasons for divorce. If it is established that the future joint life of the spouses and preservation of the marriage would be contrary to the interests of one of them, the court should terminate the marriage. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no interference in married life by the courts and under such circumstances there were grounds for dissolution of the marriage, as its continuation was contrary to the plaintiff’s interests.

Позивач просив суд розірвати його шлюб із дружиною (відповідачем). Він стверджував, що їхнє подружнє життя закінчилося, і що саме відповідач винна в тому, що їхня сім’я розпалася. Після того, як у 2014 році відповідач забрала дітей, його майно та покинула його, вона проживала окремо від позивача, не перебувала з ним у шлюбних стосунках, не вела спільного господарства. Суд першої інстанції задовольнив позов про розірвання шлюбу та дійшов висновку, що сім'я фактично розпалася і продовження шлюбу суперечить інтересам кожного з подружжя. Апеляційний суд залишив рішення першої інстанції без змін. Відповідач наполягала на збереженні шлюбу та подала касаційну скаргу до Верховного Суду, стверджуючи, що суди попередніх інстанцій не мають права втручатися у її стосунки з чоловіком. Сімейний кодекс України передбачає право кожного з поружжя припинити шлюбні відносини. Примушування до припинення шлюбних відносин, примушування до їх збереження, в тому числі примушування до статевого зв'язку за допомогою фізичного або психічного насильства, є порушенням права дружини, чоловіка на свободу та особисту недоторканість і може мати наслідки, встановлені законом. Таким чином, суди повинні визначити фактичні подружні стосунки та будь-які поважні причини розірвання шлюбу. Якщо буде встановлено, що подальше спільне життя подружжя та збереження шлюбу суперечило б інтересам одного з них, суд повинен розірвати шлюб. Тому Верховний Суд дійшов висновку про відсутність втручання судів у подружнє життя і, що за таких обставин були підстави для розірвання шлюбу, оскільки його продовження суперечило інтересам позивача. Тому суди мають визначати фактичні взаємини подружжя, дійсні причини позову про розірвання шлюбу. Суд постановляє рішення про розірвання шлюбу, якщо буде встановлено, що подальше спільне життя подружжя і збереження шлюбу суперечило б інтересам одного з них. Таким чином, Верховний Суд дійшов висновку про відсутність втручання судів у подружнє життя і, що за таких обставин були підстави для розірвання шлюбу, оскільки його продовження суперечило інтересам позивача.

The applicant was given refugee status and had successfully applied for permission for his second wife to join him in Ireland. The present case arose when he sought to have his first wife join him. In considering the legal consequences of a polygamous marriage entered into in another country, the Supreme Court ruled that, where a man had married two wives under the laws of Lebanon, the first marriage is valid under Irish law but the second is not. The appellant (husband) had married two women in a manner permissible under the laws of Lebanon (their previous state of domicile). He sought a declaration, pursuant to Section 29 of the Family Law Act 1995, that his marriage to his first wife was valid on the date of its inception. The High Court found the polygamous marriage entirely invalid. On appeal, the Supreme Court reasoned that: (a) rules of private international law require the State to recognize a marriage validly contracted under a foreign system of law unless such recognition is prohibited by public policy; (b) the Constitution and Irish public policy envisage a marriage as a union between two people based on the principles of equality and mutual commitment; (c) there is therefore no bar to recognizing a marriage “that is in fact monogamous, where the only objection is that the system of law under which the couple married would permit more than one marriage;” and (d) Irish law and the Irish Constitution preclude the recognition of a second or subsequent marriage while the first marriage is valid, although that does not mean that a subsequent marriage can never have legal consequences. The Court granted the declaration of the validity of the first marriage because it was valid when contracted and the husband’s subsequent marriage should not preclude that.

This case considers conformity of a Constitutional provision declaring that the State recognizes marriages registered in church with the Matrimonial and Family Code, which states that only civil marriages have legal effect. A widow was refused inheritance from her deceased spouse because their marriage was not contracted in a civil office before the passage of the Constitution. The Court affirmed that Constitutional provisions could not be applied retroactively, and thus only after 1992 when the legislation came into force can a church marriage be recognized by the State. English translation available here.

Šioje byloje nagrinėjamos konstitucinės nuostatos, skelbiančios, kad valstybė pripažįsta bažnyčioje įregistruotas santuokas, atitikimas santuokos ir šeimos kodeksui, kuriame teigiama, kad teisinę galią turi tik civilinės santuokos. Našlei buvo atsisakyta išduoti paveldėjimo teisės liudijimą, nes santuoka su vėlioniu nebuvo sudaryta civilinės metrikacijos institucijose iki Konstitucijos priėmimo. Teismas patvirtino, kad konstitucinės nuostatos negali būti taikomos atgaline data, todėl tik po 1992 m., kai įstatymas įsigaliojo, valstybė gali pripažinti bažnytinę santuoką.

This divorce case involved a couple that was married for 25 years. The petitioner-wife filed for divorce due to unreasonable behavior and adultery. She requested custody of their minor child, property rights as the court deemed fit, and that the respondent-husband vacate the marital home, pay a dissolution settlement, and cover court costs. The respondent, who was the family’s primary source of financial support, funded the construction of the parties’ marital home. Despite her inability to contribute financially, the wife oversaw construction of the home and took care of the couple’s children while the husband was away for years, both for work and in prison. The Supreme Court determined that, despite her failure to contribute financially to the parties’ acquisition of the marital home, the wife’s in-kind contributions to the family entitled her to a share of the marital home. Specifically, the court held that “principles of general fundamental human rights require that a person who is married to another and generally supervises the home, such that the other partner has a free hand to engage in economic activities, must not be discriminated against in the distribution of properties acquired during the marriage when the marriage is dissolved.”

The Constitutional Court reviewed the constitutionality of the law “on Amendments and Additions to the Code of the Republic of Belarus on Marriage and Family” dated 2011. The Court noted that the Constitution protects marriage, family, motherhood, fatherhood, and childhood. It further noted that the protection and strengthening of the family institution is an integral part of the State’s social policy and held that amendments to the Code are aimed at protecting the family. The Court further noted that the Constitutional guarantee on the equality of both spouses means equal rights and obligations, including the obligation, financially, to support the other spouse. This constitutional guarantee is implemented by the amendments to the Code as it expands the list of circumstances when one spouse can apply to a court for maintenance, including when that spouse is caring for a disabled common child. The Court also held that amendments to the Code establishing that certain contracts between the spouses, such as a prenuptial agreement and agreement on payment of alimony if they contain conditions regarding immovable property, have to be registered with the appropriate State organs, are aimed at ensuring legal certainty and consistency of legal regulation of marriage and family relationships. The Court held that the law “on Amendments and Additions to the Code of the Republic of Belarus on Marriage and Family” dated 2011 was constitutional as it was aimed at strengthening marriage and family institutions, and increasing the spouses’ awareness of their rights and responsibilities.

The petitioner was divorced by her husband after 15 years of marriage by means of the talaq-e-biddat declaration. She filed a writ petition arguing that the declaration was unconstitutional. Talaq-e-biddat is a practice whereby a Muslim man can divorce his wife upon saying “talaq-e-baddat” thrice in one sitting. The wife’s consent is not required in this practice. The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court of India declared the practice unconstitutional by a majority vote of 3:2 and injuncted Muslim husbands from pronouncing “Talaq-e-biddat” as a means for severing the marital ties. The court reasoned that the practice is unconstitutional because it is manifestly arbitrary in nature. There was also a concurring opinion which held that the practice of talaq-e-biddat is against the holy Quran and thus lacks legal sanction. In its judgement, the Court also directed the Parliament of India to take appropriate measures to bring related legislation into effect. Consequently, the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act came into effect on 31st of July 2019.

This case concerns the sharing of spousal property upon divorce. On 22 December 1986, the High Court dissolved the marriage between the husband (“H”) and his wife (“W”) on a petition and cross-petition for divorce filed by H and W, respectively. Subsequently, the Court heard the parties’ claims for ancillary relief in which both H and W claimed ownership of the same house. The High Court found that W was the sole owner of the house. H appealed to the Court of Appeal, which concluded that the main house belonged to both H and W but since the extensions to the house were solely funded by W, W was the sole owner of the extensions. H appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that H made some contribution to the extensions as well as to the household expenses and the clear intention of the parties in acquiring the extensions was to provide more space in the house for their joint benefit and that of their children. It was therefore held, dismissing the appeal, that the principle that property jointly acquired during marriage became joint property applied; and such property was to be shared equally on divorce.

This case concerns the criteria for what constitutes a valid customary marriage. In question was whether or not the respondent was precluded from marrying another as a result of the prior customary marriage alleged. The case arose after the complainant filed a caveat against the issue of a registrar’s certificate in respect to an alleged ordinance marriage between the respondent and another woman. The complainant claimed that she was married to the respondent under customary law at a ceremony held in March 1958 at which both her family and the respondent’s family were present and that was presided over by the head of the larger family to which both of the families belong; that the ceremony called “fiapun” in Adangbe was performed; and that the respondent’s family provided drinks and a customary fee for the marriage. Therefore, the complainant claimed that the respondent was precluded under Ordinance from marrying another. The respondent denied that the ceremony held in March 1958 constituted a lawful marriage under customary law and further maintained that whatever relationship subsisted between him and the complainant was determined by their subsequent separation. The Court confirmed that the essential pre-requisites laid out in Yaotey v Quaye. It also held that consent by the two parties’ families may be actual or constructive. The Court held that the unrefuted evidence presented by the complainant of the ceremony and cohabitation contained all the essential elements of a valid customary marriage. The Court also held that since the marriage is as much the families’ concern as it is the concern of the two individuals, the agreement of the parties to live apart does not affect their legal status, and the marriage will subsist until the marriage is dissolved by the family. The Court confirmed that a marriage under the Ordinance and a customary marriage was mutually exclusive, and the existence of one precluded the other. The complainant’s application for prohibition of the Registrar of Marriages from issuing the certificate was sustained, as she and the respondent were still married under customary law.

The petitioner asked for dissolution of marriage with the respondent. In June 2011, the petitioner went on a foreign peacekeeping mission as a member of the Kenya Air Force. When she returned at the end of the month, she found that the respondent had cohabited with, married, and impregnated another woman. The respondent gave the petitioner an ultimatum between a polygamous marriage or divorce despite the their monogamous civil marriage. The petitioner stated that she had lived separately from the respondent for six years because he tried to force her to enter into a polygamous marriage when she intended to engage into only a single marriage. The court held the respondent guilty of cruelty against the petitioner and found that the marriage had, on account of the respondent’s behavior and the long separation of over six years, irretrievably broken down. The court granted the dissolution of marriage.

The appellant challenged a lower court ruling granting the respondent, his ex-partner, an equitable division of marital assets (bienes de la comunidad de hecho) upon the dissolution of their relationship. The appellant argued that 1) the court erroneously found the relationship to be a “common law marriage” (unión more uxurio) and 2) regardless of the character of the relationship, the appellant was the sole owner of the assets at issue as the respondent did not work outside the home. The appellant and the respondent had been in a monogamous, cohabiting relationship for 17 years and had three children together. The lower court found these facts supported by the testimony of witnesses through sworn affidavits, which the appellant challenged as insufficient to establish the character of the relationship. However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that a court may take into consideration such sworn testimony and that the birth of three children to the couple was indisputable and officially documented. The Supreme Court agreed that a stable, monogamous, familial relationship had been sufficiently established, giving rise to the presumption that the respondent was entitled to her share of the common assets, if proven that she contributed to their acquisition. The Supreme Court also rejected the appellant’s arguments that the respondent could not be entitled to common assets because she was not employed outside the home and thus did not contribute financially to the acquisition of the common assets. The Court cited the Fundamental Rights of the Family (number 11, article 55) recognizing that work in the home is also “economic activity that creates added value and produces wealth and societal wellbeing” (“actividad económica que crea valor agregado y produce riqueza y bienestar social”). Following this principle, the Court stated that a partner working in the home and caring for the children sustained and supported the partner working outside the home. Accordingly, it affirmed the decision of the lower court.

El apelante discutió una decisión del tribunal inferior que le otorgaba a la demandada, su ex pareja, una división equitativa de los bienes de la comunidad de hecho al disolverse su relación. El apelante argumentó que 1) el tribunal consideró erróneamente que la relación era un “matrimonio de hecho“ o “unión libre“ (unión more uxurio) y 2) independientemente del carácter de la relación, el apelante era el único propietario de los bienes en cuestión porque la demandada nunca trabajó fuera de casa. El apelante y la demandada habían estado en una relación de convivencia monógama durante 17 años y tenían tres hijos juntos. El tribunal de primera instancia encontró estos hechos respaldados por el testimonio de testigos mediante declaraciones juradas, que el apelante impugnó como insuficientes para establecer el carácter de la relación. Sin embargo, la Corte Suprema rechazó este argumento, señalando que un tribunal puede tomar en consideración dichos testimonios jurados y que el nacimiento de tres hijos de la pareja era indiscutible y oficialmente documentado. La Corte Suprema acordó que se había establecido con suficiencia legal una relación familiar estable, monógama. La Corte continúo que este establecimiento daba lugar a la presunción de que la demandada tenía derecho a su parte de los bienes comunes, si se demostraba que contribuyó a su adquisición. La Corte Suprema también rechazó los argumentos de la recurrente de que la demandada no podía tener derecho a bienes comunes porque no estaba empleada fuera del hogar y, por lo tanto, no contribuía financieramente a la adquisición de los bienes comunes. La Corte citó los Derechos Fundamentales de la Familia (número 11, artículo 55) reconociendo que el trabajo en el hogar es también “actividad económica que crea valor agregado y produce riqueza y bienestar social” (“actividad económica que crea valor agregado y produce riqueza y bienestar social ”). Siguiendo este principio, la Corte manifestó que un miembro de una pareja que trabajaba en el hogar y cuidaba a los niños sostenía y apoyaba al otro miembro que trabajaba fuera del hogar. En consecuencia, la decisión del tribunal inferior fue afirmada.

The applicant (wife), her husband, and their children lived in Austria and held dual Austrian and Kosovar citizenship. After marriage problems arose between the couple, the husband took the children away from the wife while they were in Kosovo and kept them away from her. The husband’s family wanted to resolve the matter according to Albanian tradition, causing the wife to fear that the children would stay with the father. She thus initiated legal proceedings for the children’s return to Austria. Pursuant to The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Children Abduction, the Austrian Ministry of Justice requested the Kosovar Ministry of Justice to assist in the children’s return, and the Kosovar authorities initiated proceedings in the country’s courts for such an order. The District Court held hearings in the presence of the husband but without the wife or prosecutor, and ruled for the husband, finding that no abduction had taken place. The Supreme Court quashed the decision and remanded the case for retrial. Following retrial, the District Court again ruled that, under The Hague Convention, returning the children was unnecessary, as it would have a negative impact on the children because they had developed a strong emotional bond with their father, they were attending school in Kosovo, and the couple had marital problems. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the return of the children might cause them psychological damage. The wife then filed a request for repetition of procedure, arguing that she and the prosecutor were not given the opportunity to participate in the session in which the District Court reviewed the request to return the children. The Supreme Court rejected the request, stating that the procedural parties were the Ministry of Justice and the husband, not the wife, and that the participation of the prosecutor was not legally obligatory. The wife appealed to the Constitutional Court, alleging that her rights guaranteed under Article 31 of the Constitution of Kosovo (Right to Fair and Impartial Trial), and under Article 6 (Right to Fair Trial) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, had been violated. The Constitutional Court held that by not being present at the session, the wife was unable to refute her husband and was deprived of the possibility of convincing the District Court that the children should be returned. The wife was thus placed at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis her opponent, in violation of the principle of equality of arms, which is one aspect of the right to fair trial under European Court of Human Rights case law. Finding the wife’s right to a fair trial violated, the Constitutional Court accordingly invalidated the Supreme Court’s decisions and ordered the District Court to repeat the proceedings and invite the wife to participate. (Also available in Srpski, English, and Türkçe.)

The deceased victim D.K. met her partner A.J. in secondary school, formed a union with him, and gave birth to a daughter. D.K. subsequently filed a claim to dissolve the union and for child custody at the Municipal Court because of a deterioration in her relationship with A.J. She also took their daughter to live with her parents. Following continuous threats by A.J., D.K. submitted a request to the Municipal Court for an emergency protection order under the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence. The court did not act within the statutorily mandated 24 hours of the request, and A.J. shot and killed D.K. several weeks later. The Kosovo Judicial Council (“KLJ”, the body which administers the judiciary) disciplinary committee issued a decision to discipline the responsible Municipal Court judge in response to a request by the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel, but D.K.’s parents were not party to the disciplinary proceedings. D.K.’s parents submitted a referral to the Constitutional Court, alleging the Municipal Court by its inaction violated D.K.’s rights under the Constitution of Kosovo, including Article 25 (Right to Life), Article 32 (Right to Legal Remedies), and Article 54 (Judicial Protection of Rights), as well as under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), including Article 2 (Right to Life) and Article 13 (Right to Effective Remedy). The Constitutional Court observed that ECHR caselaw stresses that it is the duty of state authorities to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. This includes a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive measures to (i) protect one whose life is at risk from another, (ii) where the authorities knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from a criminal offense, but (iii) failed to take measures which reasonably might have been expected to avoid the risk. The court found the Municipal Court ought to have known about the real risk in existence when D.K. requested the emergency protection order since she had explained the deterioration of her relationship with A.J., specifically his death threats and her reports to the police. Furthermore, the Municipal Court was handling D.K.’s case for the dissolution of union and child custody. Accordingly, the tribunal concluded that the Municipal Court was responsible for acting under the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence and that its inaction was a violation of Article 25 of the Constitution and Article 2 of the ECHR. The court also found that the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence and the statute governing the judiciary do not offer effective legal remedies for the protection of the applicants’ rights, because the former does not contain measures for addressing court inaction, and the latter does not allow the applicants to participate in any disciplinary investigation or procedure. Thus, the inaction of the Municipal Court and the KJC’s practice of not addressing judicial inaction violated the deceased’s and applicants’ right under Articles 32 and 54 of the Constitution and Article 13 of the ECHR. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

The petitioner was a mother who moved with her husband, the respondent, to Canada with their three minor children in 2009. The respondent moved back to Lahore, Pakistan and the children stayed with the petitioner in Canada. The respondent wanted the entire family to move back to Lahore. To this end, he approached the Guardian Court in Lahore and declared himself as the guardian of the person and property of his children. When they came to visit him, he refused to let the children go back to Canada. Under the Guardians & Wards Act of 1890, the Guardian Court is any lower court that can hear an application for custody and guardianship of children. The respondent proceeded to file an application for custody of the children before the Guardian Court. The petitioner was in Canada when she received the notice of the proceedings for custody and unable to immediately enter Pakistan as her visa had expired. In her absence, the Guardian Court passed an order giving the custody of the children to the respondent until the petitioner could appear before the Guardian Court. The petitioner filed an application to the High Court for custody of her children, which was dismissed as the matter was still pending before the Guardian Court. The High Court’s reasoning was that because the Guardian Court is where the evidence and witnesses are evaluated, it is the appropriate forum for the case to be heard for custody of children. The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether the High Court had jurisdiction to hear the petition on custody matters pending a final decision by the Guardian Court. The Supreme Court observed from previous case law that the Guardian Court is the final arbiter on questions of custody of a child. However, this should not disadvantage a person illegally deprived of custody of a minor child from a remedy to regain custody pending adjudication by the Guardian Court. On this basis, the Supreme Court held that the High Court has the right to pass orders where it would be in the best interest and welfare of the minor. The Supreme Court also held that the High Court has jurisdiction to restore custody to the person lawfully holding such custody while the Guardian Court gives its final orders. After considering that the children wanted to move back to Canada with their mother, the order was passed in her favor.

The appellant and respondent were German nationals whose marriage was recognized in Hong Kong and who were initiating a divorce. Prior to their marriage, they had entered into a prenuptial agreement under German law. The court considered whether Hong Kong was the proper forum for the divorce proceedings, and whether a Hong Kong court should stay the divorce action at the request of one of the parties, due to ongoing divorce proceedings in Germany. The court adopted the principles of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom decision in Radmacher v Granatino (2011) favoring prenuptial agreements. This reversed the previously long-held position that prenuptial agreements were against public policy and not to be enforced.

Here, the Court held that the termination of a marriage should lead to the division of matrimonial property between the two spouses. This rule applies when both spouses have contributed, financially or otherwise, toward the acquisition of the property. In this case, even though the marriage between the two partners was declared void, the Court held that the two matrimonial properties should be divided between the partners. The Court also held that custody arrangements should not excessively restrict the access of one parent to the child.

In a pending divorce case, the trial court entered an order for the parties to “refrain from molesting, harassing, besetting, intimidating and/or threatening and carrying out physical or other abuse of the other.” The wife subsequently accused the husband of sexual molestation and violating the court’s order. The court explained that “an allegation of sexual molestation in any form is very serious and the onus is on the wife to prove to the Court beyond a reasonable doubt that the husband breached the Order by committing the acts of sexual molestation as alleged.” The court held that the “wife has failed to discharge this burden” because: (i) there was no evidence from any corroborating witness; (ii) there was no corroborating evidence from the doctor who examined the wife; (iii) both parties chose not to cross-examine the deponents who swore to the affidavits in the committal application; and (iv) “the husband’s version of the events on 5th March is equally plausible as the wife’s” version of events.

Mientras un caso de divorcio estaba pendiente, el tribunal de primera instancia emitió una orden para que las partes "se abstengan de molestar, acosar, acosar, intimidar y / o amenazar y llevar a cabo abuso físico o de otro tipo del otro." Posteriormente, la esposa acusó al marido de abuso sexual y de violar la orden del tribunal. El tribunal explicó que “una acusación de abuso sexual en cualquier forma es muy grave y la esposa tiene la responsabilidad de demostrarle al tribunal más allá de toda duda razonable que el esposo violó la Orden al cometer los actos de abuso sexual como se alega.” El tribunal sostuvo que la “esposa no había cumplido con esta carga” porque: (i) no hubo evidencia de ningún testigo que lo corrobore; (ii) no hubo evidencia que corrobore por parte del médico que examinó a la esposa; (iii) ambas partes optaron por no contrainterrogar a los declarantes que habían jurado las declaraciones en la solicitud inicial; y (iv) "la versión del marido de los hechos del 5 de marzo era igualmente plausible que la versión de la esposa" donde lo acusaba de los hechos.

The appellant-wife appealed to the Intermediate People’s Court of Wuxi Municipality, Jiangsu Province in relation to the lower court’s refusal to grant a divorce. The appellant alleged that her marriage with the appellee was irreparably broken and that he had committed domestic violence against her. The appellant alleged that the domestic violence was corroborated by their daughter’s testimony and photographic evidence. The court held that even though the appellee might have beaten the appellant on at least one occasion, under the legal definition, domestic violence must constitute continuous multiple-time battery rather than [one occasional][1] conduct. Since the evidence submitted by the appellant was insufficient to demonstrate that the appellee’s conduct caused harmful consequences to the appellant, the court refused to grant their divorce. The court also admonished the appellee to fulfill his responsibility as a husband and to stop his "bad habits."

离婚、家庭暴力

上诉人周某因与被上诉人杨某1离婚纠纷一案，不服无锡市惠山区不准予双方离婚的判决，向江苏省无锡市中级人民法院提起上诉。周某称双方感情确已破裂，并且杨某1对其存在家暴行为。上诉人称双方女儿的证言与照片证据证明了家暴行为的存在。法院认为，根据证据，虽然不排除杨某1有打过周某的可能性，但家庭暴力不只是一次偶然性的行为，而是持续性多次施暴的行为。因为周某提交的证据不足以证明被上诉人的行为对周某造成了伤害，法院拒绝了周某的上诉请求。法院同时要求杨某1作为丈夫有所担当，戒除生活中的不良习惯。

[1] Note to draft: This concept is unclear. The exact translation of the Mandarin phrase would be “one occasional conduct.” From the context of the opinion, it appears that this means that occasional conduct, even if more than once, may not be sufficient if it is not indicative of a pattern of abuse.

Petitioners, husband, and wife filed cross-petitions for legal separation rather than an absolute divorce where the matrimonial bonds are completely broken. The Family Court dismissed both petitions because the husband’s stated reason for seeking legal separation was “irreconcilable differences.” The text of the statute ordaining legal separation seemed to require that it be an interim measure pending the reconciliation of the parties. Legal separation because of irreconcilable differences therefore, on its face, seemed to be an inconsistent proposition. The issue on appeal was whether irreconcilable differences could be grounds for a merely legal separation rather than an absolute divorce. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that based on the history of legal separation and legislative intent, a party can seek legal separation based on irreconcilable differences without needing to show that there is a possibility of reconciliation. Statutory text that seemed to contradict this ruling by requiring a show of a possibility for reconciliation was precatory but not mandatory.

In this divorce case, the husband appealed the trial court’s decision to grant spousal support to the wife notwithstanding her adultery, based on the court’s finding that manifest injustice would otherwise result. The appellant and the appellee were married for 20 years and had two children. The appellant had a stable career in the trucking business and earned $250,000 per year and had assets totaling more than $6 million. The appellee was the primary caretaker for the children and worked part-time as a receptionist earning $10 an hour. She did not contest that she had an affair for at least five years during the marriage. The court noted, however, that the evidence “portrayed the appellant as a profane and verbally abusive man,” who frequented “strip joints and topless bars,” and frequently boasted and bragged about these experiences in lewd terms in front of the appellee and their children. He was also verbally abusive to his children. Several witnesses testified that “they had never once seen [him] show any affection or any kindness toward [his wife],” and that he “chronically complained” to the appellee and others about her “weight, appearance, housekeeping, and spending habits.” The trial court explained that Va. Code § 20-107.1(B)the law precludes an award of support to any spouse found guilty of adultery, subject to narrow exceptions, including when the trial court determines from “clear and convincing evidence, that denial of support and maintenance would constitute manifest injustice, based upon the respective degrees of fault during the marriage or relative economic circumstances of the parties. The question before the court was whether the trial court committed a reversible error in stating that the statutory standard for deciding if a denial of support and maintenance constitutes a manifest injustice involved considering “either” the respective degrees of fault during the marriage “or” the relative economic circumstances of the parties. In affirming the ruling of the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred, but also that it was a harmless error as it was supported by facts that satisfied the correct standard. The court determined that the proper standard for determining if a denial of spousal support would constitute a manifest injustice must consider “both” the comparative economic circumstances “and” the respective degrees of fault, i.e., the test was a conjunctive test rather than the disjunctive test used by the trial court. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling under correct test. With respect to the relative degrees of fault, the Court of Appeals explained that adultery was not dispositive and that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that appellant’s severe and longstanding abusive conduct went beyond “mere incivility or petulance” and tipped the scales in appellee’s favor. Moreover, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding of “extreme disparities” in the relative economic situations of the parties. Consequently, the trial court erred in stating the standard for determining if a denial of spousal support would cause manifest injustice as requiring either economic disparities or fault instead of both factors, but the error was harmless as the factual findings addressed both factors under the appropriate standard.

In this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a parent seeking to relocate out of the country with children in his or her custody need not make a showing that his or her reasons for relocation are “compelling.” Rather, the court cited the “time-honored axiom that the primary consideration and paramount concern in all matters relating to custody is the best interests of the child.” In determining the child’s best interests, requiring a parent to demonstrate that the reason for moving was compelling would overly burden a parent’s ability to relocate for legitimate reasons. Accordingly, the court held that the family court had incorrectly applied a “compelling reason” test in denying a mother’s motion to relocate with her children, failing to consider the children’s best interests.

The appellant and respondent are divorced parents of three children. At the time of the divorce, custody of the children was awarded to the respondent. The appellant then moved for an interim protection order, claiming that the respondent physically abused their minor children. A court granted the interim protection order on October 3, 2011, and awarded the appellant interim custody of the children, subject to visitation by the respondent, and ordered respondent to cease abusing the children. The Magistrate’s Court subsequently discharged the interim order on October 24, 2011, based on Section 12 of the Combating of Domestic Violence Act 4 of 2003, reasoning that the beatings were an isolated incident and were only meant to punish the children for bad behavior. The appellant challenged the discharge. The appellate court agreed with appellant and granted a final protection order effective through July 2013, which awarded the appellant custody of the children with visitation for the respondent on alternate weekends and holidays. In its decision, the appellate court stated the importance of rooting out the “evil that is domestic violence in order to give effect to the protection of the constitutional value of human dignity.”

This case concerned the determination of what constitutes relationship property in a divorce proceeding and how trusts may affect this determination (e.g. if a sham trust is implemented to hide assets, therefore affecting a woman’s economic rights in a divorce). The term “relationship property” is defined in the Property Relationships Act of 1976, the principles of which focus on the equality of spouses and that at the end of a relationship, any economic divisions should reflect equal contributions made by the couple during the relationship. However, any property constituting “trust property” is not available for division under the PRA. In this case, the parties had been married for 17 years with two daughters. During the marriage, the respondent-husband had become a successful business owner and set up several discretionary trusts. The trusts ostensibly related to the business he had established. The appellant-wife had assisted with her husband’s business ventures and was the main childcare provider during their marriage. The Court concluded that, in this case, the powers under a trust deed constituted “property” under the PRA. In applying the two-stage approach of section 182, the Court concluded that one of the discretionary trusts settled during the Clayton’s marriage constituted a nuptial trust under §182 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 because of its connection to the marriage. The court found that the “nature of the assets is not determinative of whether the settlement is nuptial or not,” and that a settlement “made for business reasons” and containing business assets can be a nuptial settlement. The New Zealand Women’s Law Journal described this as a “decision that provided a much-needed step towards a more equal recognition of the traditional economic disadvantages faced by women.”

The petitioner applied to court for dissolution of marriage on the ground of respondent’s adultery, which was granted in 2010. The petitioner then filed for maintenance for herself and their children as well as for other miscellaneous amounts for loans and medical expenses. The court granted maintenance, which was being garnished from respondent’s salary. The respondent contested the continuation of these payments. Under Belize law, upon divorce the court has discretion to order a husband to pay maintenance to his former wife in an amount the court may think to be reasonable for the remainder of her life. The court ordered a continuation of monthly maintenance payments based on the “practice that maintenance is generally awarded on the basis of one-third of the joint incomes of the parties, less the wife’s income” in order to “supply the former wife with the necessaries, comforts, and advantages incidental to her social position.” The claims for loans and medical expenses were dismissed.

The appellant filed a complaint to divorce her husband and an action of summary proceedings to recover her property from the appellee. The appellee-husband claimed he was entitled to a property acquired during the marriage because a married woman cannot acquire property in her own name solely for herself. The Court held that, under the 1986 Constitution, (a) there is no legal significance of a woman choosing to use her husband’s surname; it does not affect the right of a woman to own property while married; (b) a woman can purchase property in her maiden name during marriage; (c) unless freely consented to, property which is owned solely by a husband’s wife cannot be controlled by her spouse. The Court ruled that the appellant proved her title to the property by a preponderance of evidence. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the verdict and directed the lower court to enter judgment to evict the appellee.

A.A. and B.A., while estranged spouses but not having applied for legal separation, were living in the same house in two separate apartments, with A.A. paying for the rental of both units. The decision to live in the same house was accepted by B.A., as it allowed them to continue helping each other with everyday tasks and to oversee the children’s education together. On June 7, 2003, B.A. alleged that the two engaged in intercourse without B.A.’s consent. On May 24, 2004, the Canton Ticino Public Prosecutor indicted A.A. before the Court of Riviera for alleged sexual violence against his wife, B.A. On July 2, 2004, the Canton Ticino Court of Appeal dismissed the indictment of the Public Prosecutor, as B.A. had withdrawn the allegation of sexual violence committed against her by her husband. The Public Prosecutor appealed the decision before the Supreme Federal Court. Under Swiss law, sexual violence against a spouse can only be prosecuted where the victim has made allegations. The Supreme Federal Court, on the basis of the evidence collected in the course of the proceeding, and as argued by the Public Prosecutor, stated that the fact that the spouses were living in two separate apartments was not material, as they were nevertheless maintaining a “communion of life” status, which could be inferred from their mutual assistance, meals together, continued feelings of affection, and occasional sexual intercourses. Therefore, on the basis of such evidence, the Supreme Federal Court stated that the decision of the Court of Appeal to dismiss the indictment of A.A. was legitimate and rejected the Public Prosecutor’s appeal.

During a divorce proceeding, a matter arose regarding contribution and participation receivables, particularly the application of the Turkish Civil Code, Number 4721, Article 219, Sub-Article 2, Sub-Paragraph 5, dated November 22, 2001, which provides that the income from a personal asset is such spouse’s acquired asset. The court of first instance held that this provision violated the Constitution, Articles 2 and 35, because it unreasonably interfered with property rights and would, therefore, prevent civil marriages. The Constitutional Court, considered the Constitution, Article 35, which simply states that property rights are universal, and this right shall only be limited if public welfare requires. The Court also considered Article 13, which states that fundamental rights and freedoms may be limited only by statute, so long as the core of such rights, as well as other relevant constitutional provisions, are not affected. The Court also noted that Article 41 establishes the state’s positive obligation to promulgate regulations to protect and preserve the institution of the family. The Court held that, while the law in question limits property rights, this limitation does not affect the core of the right and is based on justifiable purposes, and the law in question does not violate the Constitution. The justifiable purpose is protecting families, and especially women, by requiring income from a personal asset to be mutually distributed, thereby promoting public welfare.

During a four-month period, A.H. made several unlawful threats (Sw. olaga hot) toward his ex-wife. The question in the Court of Appeal was whether the unlawful threats constituted repeated violations of the ex-wife’s integrity and whether the threats were meant to seriously harm her self-esteem. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the parties were going through a divorce, where both parties expressed hurtful words to one another. As such, the Court of Appeal held that the unlawful threats did not constitute a violation of a woman’s integrity (Sw. kvinnofridskränkning).

A mother, on behalf of her infant child, filed a lawsuit for a declaratory judgment for absence of parent-child relationship with the appellant––a man to whom the mother was married when the child was born. The request for the judgment was based on the fact that a DNA test result showed that, with 99.99 percent probability, the infant was a child of a different man, with whom the mother was having an affair. By the time of the trial, the wife and the child had left the appellant to live with the child’s biological father. Article 772 of the Japanese Civil Code, in general, presumes a man to be the father of a child if the man is married to the mother of the child at the time of conception. While Article 774 allows the husband to file a proceeding to rebut such a presumption, the wife or the child does not have standing to initiate such a proceeding. The Supreme Court, stressing the importance of maintaining legal stability pertaining to familial status, found that the facts that (i) there was scientific evidence that clearly denied a biological father-child relationship and that (ii) the child was currently raised––without any problem––by the biological father does not negate the presumption of the father-child relationship under Article 772 of Japanese Civil Code, as the importance of maintaining the legal stability pertaining to familial status would not be undermined by such factors. Therefore, the Supreme Court found that there was no legal ground to deliver the requested declaratory judgment.

本件は、母親が子供を代理して、子供が生まれたときに母親が結婚していた男性である上告人に対して、親子関係不存在の確認の訴えを提起した事件である。本件において、DNA鑑定の結果、99.99％の確率で子供が上告人の生物学上の子ではないことは明白であった。裁判当時までに、母親と子供は上告人の下で監護されておらず、生物学上の父の下で成長していた。民法772条では、妻が婚姻中に懐胎した子は、夫の子と推定するとしている。また、同774条は、夫が父子関係の推定を覆すための手続きを行うことを認めているが、妻や子にこのような手続きを開始する資格を認めていない。最高裁は、家族的地位に係る法的安定性を維持することの重要性を強調した上で、（1）生物学的な父子関係を明らかに否定する科学的証拠があり、（2）子が現在何の問題もなく生物学上の父に育てられているという事実があっても、そのような要因によって家族的地位に係る法的安定性を維持することの重要性が損なわれることはないとして、民法772条の父子関係の推定を否定するものではないとした。

The petitioner filed a petition for the dissolution of his marriage. Under Zambian law, there is only one ground for divorce: that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. A marriage has irretrievably broken down when there is no chance of the parties resuming cohabitation. The High Court observed that, on the facts, the conduct and lifestyle of the parties, especially during the period when the suit’s hearing was pending, was utterly inconsistent with that of a couple whose marriage has irretrievably broken-down. In particular, the parties still continued to enjoy family life, the petitioner was still supporting the respondent financially, and the parties continued to enjoy a sexual relationship. In this light, the High Court rejected the submission that there was no mutual love between the parties and concluded that the respondent had not behaved which would preclude the petitioner from reasonably being able to live with the respondent. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the petition.

The defendant alleged that he was induced to make and execute an agreement to pay the plaintiff various amounts following the breakdown of their 10-year relationship, including: payment of US $50,000 (with US $30,000 to be paid initially followed by the remainder; this was subsequently amended to US $60,000), payment of the plaintiff’s rental and medical expenses for 12 months, the purchase of furniture and a computer, and the provision of financial support to the plaintiff’s daughter who was studying. The defendant freely paid the plaintiff US $30,000 but did not honor the rest of the proposed agreement. The defendant claimed that the agreement had been entered into by duress on the part of the plaintiff or alternatively, should be set aside for lack of consideration, and therefore counterclaimed the US$30,000 paid under that agreement. In reply, the plaintiff claimed that: (i) there was a common law marriage between the parties for the defendant held himself out as the plaintiff’s husband and father to her children and for all intents and purposes they lived as husband and wife; and, (ii) the defendant entered into the agreement willingly. The Supreme Court concluded that, in the present case, there was no celebration of marriage and, therefore, the parties could not be presumed to have been married under common law. Further, the Supreme Court noted that there was evidence in support of the position that the agreement was the result of blackmail on the part of the plaintiff who held various sensitive documents of the defendant and threatened to report the defendant to the Zambia Revenue Authority if he did not agree to enter into the agreement. The Supreme Court noted that the evidence established that the agreement had been entered into under duress and therefore was capable of being set aside on this basis. However, a party who enters into a contract under duress has the option of ratifying the contract or seeking to avoid it once the duress has come to an end. The Supreme Court noted that while the defendant paid the US $30,000 with full knowledge of all the circumstances (including suspecting that the plaintiff no longer had any sensitive documents in her possession), the defendant could not have legally ratified the contract, as it was invalid for lack of consideration (in particular, any consideration would be past consideration because the relationship had ended and the plaintiff was supposed to move out of the defendant’s house anyway as she had no legal right to continue staying there). Accordingly, the Supreme Court ordered the plaintiff to refund US$30,000 without interest to the defendant on the basis that the plaintiff should not be unjustly enriched by the threat (with costs to be borne by the plaintiff, to be agreed upon or taxed in default of agreement).

Mr. and Mrs. Pavey were married in 1945 and lived in the same matrimonial house for more than thirty years. Mr. Pavey had provided Mrs. Pavey with housekeeping money for the matrimonial home, but ceased this practice after an incident in April 1974. As a result, Mrs. Pavey successfully applied to the Magistrates’ Court for a maintenance order against her husband. The marriage continued to deteriorate, and Mrs. Pavey applied to the Family Court of Australia for dissolution of the marriage in 1976, which the Court denied. Mrs. Pavey then appealed to the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia, which allowed the appeal. The Court found that the lower court had erred in finding that the marital relationship had not broken down such that dissolution was appropriate. Extending the reasoning in In the Marriage of Todd (No. 2), the Court held that there are several signs indicating a close marital relationship, such as “living under the same roof, sexual relations, mutual protection, nurturing and supporting a child of the marriage, and recognition both in public, and private of the relationship.” However, the Court also found that all the constituent elements need not be shown in establishing the existence of a matrimonial relationship due to the natural ebbs and flows of a marriage, and not every relationship is the same. Therefore, when determining whether separation has in fact occurred, it is more useful to compare and contrast the nature of the relationship before and after the separation. Thus, the Court found that the fact that Mr. Pavey had been ordered to make maintenance payments demonstrated that marriage had broken down, even though both spouses continued to live in the matrimonial home and perform certain chores for each other.

Mrs. Angela Merici Mendoza Minier challenged the constitutionality of Article 35 of Law number 1306-Bis published on May 21st, 1937, which provided that a divorced woman could not marry within 10 months after the divorce. Mrs. Angela argued that Article 35 contravened the gender equality provision provided in Article 39 of the Constitution because the 10-month waiting period to remarry did not apply to men. Article 35 thus conferred a privilege only to men. The attorney-general disregarded the action on the basis that the petitioner lacked legitimate interest. However, the Constitutional Court determined that as a woman, Mrs. Angela could be affected by Article 35 and ruled that she therefore had a legitimate interest in challenging Article 35. The Constitutional Court subsequently admitted the action and nullified Article 35 on the basis that it no longer fulfilled its aim to prevent a woman from remarrying when already pregnant with her former husband’s child because it could have negative consequences for the child or the newly formed couple. As technology now allows women to know their state of pregnancy at an early stage, the restriction is no longer needed. Moreover, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that it is a woman’s decision to remarry, pregnant or not.

La Sra. Angela Merici Mendoza Minier desafió la constitucionalidad del artículo 35 de la Ley número 1306-Bis publicada el 21 de mayo de 1937, la cuál establecía que una mujer divorciada no podría casarse por un período de 10 meses posteriormente a un divorcio. La Sra. Angela sostuvo que el artículo 35 era contrario a la disposición de igualdad de género garantizada en el artículo 39 de la Constitución porque el período de espera de 10 meses para volver a casarse no se aplicaba a los hombres. Ella propuso que el artículo 35 confería un privilegio único a los hombres. El fiscal general ignoró la acción basándose en que la peticionaria no tenía un interés legítimo en la acción. Sin embargo, el Tribunal Constitucional determinó que, como mujer, la Sra. Angela podría verse afectada por el artículo 35 y dictaminó que, por lo tanto, esto era un interés legítimo suficiente para impugnar el artículo 35. Posteriormente, el Tribunal Constitucional admitió la acción y anuló el artículo 35 sobre la base de que no cumplía su objetivo inicial de evitar que una mujer se volviera a casar mientras ya estaba embarazada con el hijo de su ex esposo, lo cual podría tener consecuencias negativas para el niño o para la pareja recién formada. Como la tecnología ahora permite a las mujeres conocer su estado de embarazo desde una etapa temprana, dicha restricción ya no es necesaria. Además, el Tribunal Constitucional agregó que es una decisión personal de la mujer volver a casarse, embarazada o no.

The executor of the estate of a deceased man (the appellant) brought an application to the High Court for a declaration that the civil marriage to the respondent was bigamous and invalid because of a number of pre-existing customary marriages between the deceased and three other women. The deceased considered the marriages over when the women left him and never returned. The deceased had executed a will and later four codicils. The High Court found that the respondent’s civil law marriage was a lawful marriage in community of property, and the will was declared null and void. The appeal is of the order of the High Court. The Supreme Court heard testimony from one of the wives married to the deceased under customary law and from experts in Swazi law and custom relating to the dissolution of customary marriages. The Supreme Court found in favour of the appellant. The decision of the High Court was set aside and the Master of the High Court was to appoint a suitable and proper person to administer the deceased estate. This case is important as it illustrates the importance and status of Swazi law.

Until 1976, the rules applicable on marriage and divorce originated in the Code Napoléon. At that time, the right to manage property within a marriage was held entirely by the man. To ensure that women would not suffer the negative consequences of bad management by their spouse (i.e., debts), in the event the marriage was dissolved they had the option to decline or to accept the division of assets and liabilities within a specified period. Silence meant that all matrimonial property rights and obligations were declined. The Civil Code was amended from mid-1976 by the Law of 14 July 1976 to remove this discrimination but contained transitional provisions requiring the old rules to continue to apply under certain circumstances. In the case at hand (in which the women failed to make a declaration within the old deadline), the Constitutional Court was asked if the old provisions still applied for marriages entered into before the amendments became applicable and dissolved after that date. The first court ruled that the deadline no longer applied (as there was no basis for it because men and women acquired equal rights to manage matrimonial property in 1976), but it took successive appeals, culminating in an appeal before the Belgian Supreme Court, to confirm this and annul the relevant transitional provisions.

The “Civil Party” brought allegations of adultery against her husband and the “cohabitant”, claiming her husband abandoned her to live with the cohabitant despite her earlier marriage with her husband in 1980. The Civil Party and her husband had three children before he moved away. A dowry was regularly paid on the marriage throughout and no party contests the 1980 marriage. As such, the marriage could generally qualify under Congolese law as a ‘monogamous customary marriage’ under the law of November 30, 2000, which does not require the date of the marriage or any registry number to be filed with the State. The Civil Party’s husband and his cohabitant claim the civil party knew and authorized their cohabitation because she refused to relocate with her husband when his work required him to do so and that she visited them at their home, all of which she contests. Despite the lack of contest by any party to the prior marriage and recognition that a monogamous customary marriage exists here, the Tribunal suspended the case until the marriage was registered because Article 380 of the Congolese Family Code requires a ‘monogamous customary marriage’ to be registered before either party can exercise rights in court. (Available on pages 136-137 on linked site.)

The plaintiff, who had divorced her former husband and remarried seven months later, sued the State claiming that she had suffered mental distress due to a provision in the Civil Code which barred women from remarrying until six months after the dissolution or rescission of her previous marriage. Both the District Court and the High Court dismissed the plaintiff’s argument, saying that the restriction was not necessarily unreasonable because it was meant to avert confusion over the paternity of any children born immediately after a divorce. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding that the provision violated the Constitution only to the extent that the restriction exceeded 100 days, because 1) the Civil Code already provided that a child born more than 200 days after the formation of a marriage or less than 300 days after the dissolution/rescission of a marriage would be presumed to have been conceived within the marriage, and 2) advances in medical technology and societal changes made it difficult to justify a restriction lasting beyond 100 days. However, the Supreme Court also affirmed the District Court and High Court in finding that the State was not liable in this case for failing to abolish the regulation, as this did not constitute an exceptional case that might incur liability under the State Redress Act. Shortly after this judgment, the Civil Code was amended to decrease the six-month waiting period to 100 days.

前夫と離婚し、7か月後に再婚した原告が、民法に基づく６か月の再婚禁止期間により精神的苦痛を受けたとして、国家賠償法に基づき損害賠償を求めた事案である。地裁、高裁ともに、再婚禁止期間に関する規定は、父子関係をめぐる紛争の発生を防ぐことにあり、直ちに過剰な制約であると言えないと判断し、原告の請求を棄却した。一方、最高裁は、民法では、婚姻の成立の日から200日を経過した後又は婚姻の解消の日から300日以内に生まれた子を当該婚姻に係る夫の子と推定していること、また、医療の発達及び社会の変化により、100日を超える制限を正当化することは困難であることなどから、100日を超える制限については憲法違反であるとした。しかし、最高裁は、国家賠償法の適用の観点から見た場合には、国家賠償法は適用されないとする地裁および高裁の判断を支持した。本判決直後、民法が改正され、6か月の再婚禁止期間が100日に短縮された。

Ms. Yolcu had a child with her husband. After the finalization of her divorce and custody proceedings, which gave her custody of the child, she petitioned the Court of First Instance to change the child’s last name to her maiden name. The Court of First Instance found that a child’s last name could only be changed if the father consented or if the child, when he/she reached a lawful age, duly filed a petition for such change. The Court of Appeals approved the lower court’s decision upon appeal, which led to Ms. Yolcu’s individual application to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court set aside the lower courts’ decisions and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance for retrial. The Constitutional Court accepted Ms. Yolcu’s claim that her right to private family life had been infringed. The Constitutional Court noted that marriage partners have equal legal standing pertaining to rights and responsibilities during marriage and after divorce. Consequently, the Constitutional Court held that giving the male partner the right to determine the child’s last name within the scope of custodial rights but withholding that right from the female partner with custody constituted discriminatory treatment without reasonable justification. Consequently, the Court of First Instance’s decision to deny Ms. Yolcu the right to determine the last name of a child over whom she had custody was a violation of the prohibition on discrimination provided in Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution in regards to a right provided to her in Article 20 of that same Constitution.

The petitioner requests a divorce from the respondent and money to care for the parties’ daughter, for whom the petitioner is the sole caregiver. The parties were married in July 2008 in Uganda and then moved to Woburn, Massachusetts, USA. The respondent husband physically abused his wife, especially when intoxicated. During the time they lived together, the respondent usually slept in the sitting room. For three years they lived apart, but were reconciled by relatives. During the reconciliation, the parties had a daughter. The respondent was never involved in caring for the child and eventually left the family home to live with his mother 45 minutes away. The petitioner returned to Uganda where she is the sole parent and provider for her daughter. The court granted the request for a divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. The court explained that the best interests of the child control all determinations relating to children. The court granted the petitioner custody of the daughter and $400 (USD or the USh equivalent) per month from the respondent for their daughter’s maintenance.

Plaintiff filed for divorce from her abusive husband after he threatened to kill her. Under Namibian law, before a judge can issue a final divorce decree, the plaintiff must ask the defendant to restore his or her conjugal rights. This process effectively requires the filing spouse to give the other party, in this case an abusive husband, a chance to re-enter the marital home to restore his/her conjugal rights. The High Court of Namibia (“High Court”) recognized the danger of applying this requirement in domestic violence cases, where the respondent may use the judicially-mandated restitution of conjugal rights as an opportunity to access and further abuse the filing spouse. In light of this risk, the High Court held that a spouse who files for divorce based on acts of domestic violence is exempt from the restitution of conjugal rights requirement.

Witnesses testified that Madame H.T. insulted her husband’s co-wife and mother in law. The Appeal Court granted divorce to Monsieur Y.K. on the sole basis that by insulting his mother his first wife had harmed his husband honor and dignity and made marital life impossible. However, quarrels between co-wives do not characterize a serious insult in a polygamous marriage. Moreover, by asking for divorce from the first wife only, the husband committed a serious injustice and violated his duty of impartiality with his wives. Additionally, insults directed at the husband’s mother do not constitute a legal basis for divorce, according to the Code des Mariages et Tutelles (Code of Marriage and Tutelage). Indeed, the Code only considers insults directly addressed at the husband as a basis for divorce. The Court held that such insults were not proved in this case and could neither be inferred from the behavior of Madame H.T. with her husband’s co-wife and mother in law, nor from her confession of having insulted her husband’s co-wife.

Both parties were committed to each other in a monogamous marriage. This commitment entails for the wife and husband multiple obligations. Among them, the obligation of cohabitation; the wife must live with her husband and her husband must welcome her. In this case, the husband granted his wife authorization to visit her parents. While she was away, he introduced another woman into his home. Following his wife refusal to come back, he demanded a divorce. The Appeal Court of Kayes held that the husband had broken his monogamous commitment and that the wife’s decision not to go back to her husband’s home until the other woman had left did not qualify for desertion. Hence the divorce at the wife’s tort was not granted. Rejecting this analysis, Monsieur A.T argued in front of the Supreme Court that bigamy cannot be presumed and was never proven and that a presumed bigamy did not exempt the wife from her duty of cohabitation (derived from the Code of Marriage and Tutelage). The Supreme Court held that by marrying a second wife without the express agreement of his lawful wife, the plaintiff had broken the rules of monogamous marriage. As a result, the Court Appeal gave sufficient legal basis to its decision. Moreover, monogamous duties should not be imposed to the wife once the husband had broken his commitment. Conditioning her return to a departure of the other woman did not constitute a desertion. Consequently the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the wife and rejected the divorce request. This case protects women married under the monogamous regime and counterbalances the strong requirement of cohabitation by ensuring that no psychological violence will be endured by having to live under the same roof as another wife.

Ms. Shah Bano Begum was married to a lawyer named Mr. Mohd. Ahmed Khan. They lived together for 43 years and had five children. In 1978, Mr. Khan threw Ms. Begum out of the shared household and Ms. Begum applied for maintenance from Mr. Khan under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.P.C, 1973). Pending her application, Mr. Khan dissolved the marriage by pronouncing a triple talaq (divorce on the triple utterance of the word “talaq” by a Muslim husband) and paid Ms. Begum 3000 rupees as mahr (money/valuable property promised to a Muslim woman for her financial security under the marriage contract) and a further sum of maintenance for the iddat period (a period of 3 months that a Muslim woman has to observe before she can remarry after her divorce). Mr. Khan argued that Ms. Begum’s claim for maintenance should be dismissed as Ms. Begum had received the amount due to her on divorce under the Muslim personal law. The lower court granted Ms. Begum’s claim for maintenance, which was set at 179 rupees per month by the High Court in a revision application. Mr. Khan appealed to the Supreme Court in 1985 and the Court held that a payment made pursuant to personal laws cannot absolve a husband of his obligation to pay fair and reasonable maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C, 1973 and a husband can be liable to pay maintenance beyond the iddat period.

Ms. Esseku and Mr. Inkoom had been married for 30 years. The husband claimed to have divorced his wife in 1995 under Muslim tradition and custom. They had one property together, which Mr. Inkoom sold without consulting Ms. Esseku or their five children, all of whom he evicted off the property. The trial court held that the property was a joint property of both parties, and nullified the sale. Examining the evidence, the Superior Court affirmed the holding because Ms. Esseku had made a “substantial contribution” to the property by building an additional two bedrooms to the house. Furthermore, the Court held that even if she had not made a substantial contribution to the acquisition of the property, she still would have been entitled to an equal share of the property because of her valuable considerations made during the marriage, like “the performance of household chores” and the “maintenance of a congenial domestic environment for the respondent to operate and acquire properties.” As such, both parties were entitled to equal shares of the property, and Mr. Inkoom could not sell the house without consulting her first.

A Burkinabe woman (T.M.) sought divorce from her Chadian husband (T.T.) on the grounds of adultery, abuse and abandonment, she also sought custody of their child. The divorce was granted in favour of T.M. in the court of Ouagadougou. The judge stated that in a divorce case involving spouses of different nationalities the governing law should be that of the common domicile of the spouses. In this case, the last common residence of the spouses was Chad. The Burkinabe judge applied the basic principle of Chadian divorce law that permits divorce for fault attributable to either spouse. The judge stated that the sole responsibility for the divorce lay with T.T. The judge went on to impose Burkinabe law as to custody granting custody of their child to T.M. T.T. was given visitation rights and was required to contribute child support towards the maintenance and education of the children

The Plaintiff (Husband) and the Defendant (Wife) married in 2004. The Defendant, initially from China, went to China on December 25, 2006 without informing the Plaintiff. The Defendant returned to the Republic of Korea on January 10, 2007 but lived with a friend rather than the Plaintiff. In March 2007, the Defendant discovered she was pregnant but did not inform her husband. The Defendant gave birth to the child in Hong Kong on August 12, 2007. After giving birth, the Defendant notified the Plaintiff that a Hong Kong birth certificate requires the father’s signature. The Plaintiff proceeded to travel to Hong Kong and signed the certificate. The Defendant-wife returned to Korea in September 2007 and proceeded to live with a friend. The Defendant attempted to keep in contact with the Plaintiff but the Plaintiff refused to maintain such contact. The Plaintiff proceeded to file a divorce claim in February 2008, alleging that “from December 2006, the contact with the Defendant was completely cut off.” The Defendant countered with her own divorce claim. The Seoul Family Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s divorce claim but upheld the Defendant’s claim, finding that the fundamental breakdown of the marriage lied with the Plaintiff. While the court noted that the Defendant was also to blame, the court emphasized the fact that the Defendant attempted to initiate contact with the Plaintiff after giving birth to their child but the Plaintiff refused to make any such effort in restoring the relationship. Thus, the court ordered the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant three million won as compensation with a five percent interest rate per annum under the Civil Act. Additionally, the court ordered the Plaintiff to pay 400,000 won per month in future child rearing expenses, despite the fact that the Plaintiff was not registered as the child’s father in the Republic of Korea’s family registry. Citing Article 844 (1) of the Civil Act, the court held that there is a presumption that the wife’s husband is the father when the wife gives birth during the marriage. In determining the amount of child rearing expenses, the court considered the age and rearing condition of the child, the age and occupation of the Plaintiff and the Defendant, as well as other circumstances.

After fifty-four years of marriage, Mr. Phiri divorced Ms. Zulu in 2006. She was the mother of his nine children, and they shared a matrimonial home on a farm. Throughout the course of the marriage, Mr. Phiri and Ms. Zulu acquired real property, comprising the farm, other residential houses, and a bar, as well as several vehicles. However, during the divorce proceedings Mr. Phiri sold many of the houses and gave two of the properties to his children as gifts. He kept the proceeds of the sales for himself. The local court of first instance ordered Mr. Phiri to surrender one of the houses, a shop, a tavern and a sewing machine to Ms. Zulu. Unhappy with the outcome, Mr. Phiri appealed to the Subordinate Court, which heard the matter de novo. The Subordinate Court came to the same conclusions as the local court, although it ordered Mr. Phiri to surrender an additional sewing machine and K 6,000,000, as compensation for the property sold during the divorce proceedings, although no valuation of the latter had taken place. Ms. Zulu appealed to the High Court, among other grounds, on the basis that Subordinate Court should have also taken into account her contribution to the marital home (the farm) and that an assessment of the sold properties (or monies from the sale thereof) should have occurred. The High Court held that because the farm was acquired and maintained through the joint efforts of the husband and wife, Ms. Zulu had acquired a beneficial interest in the farm. Accordingly, the High Court ordered a valuation of the farm and directed Mr. Phiri to pay with one-third of the value to Ms. Zulu as a lump sum. Moreover, reasoning that the K 6,000,000 payment, related to the marital property sold during the divorce proceedings, was awarded without any basis whatsoever, the High Court further ordered a valuation of such property, with Ms. Zulu to receive one half of the assessed value.

Mrs. Ana was denied a survivor’s pension because when her husband died they were already divorced. Normally, when a couple divorces and between the divorce and the death of the husband there is a period of more than ten (10) years, the ex-spouse does not have the right to a survivor’s pension. Nevertheless, as the ex-spouse was victim of physical abuse by her ex-husband during their marriage, this period of ten (10) years does not apply. As the ten (10) years period does not apply when there are physical abuses, the woman has the right to obtain the survivor’s pension even if she was divorced from her husband when he died. The decision of the High Court of Andalucía is to recognize the right of Mrs. Ana to a survivor’s pension even if she was already divorced when her husband passed away.

A la señora Ana se le negó la pensión de sobreviviente porque cuando su esposo murió, ya estaban divorciados. Normalmente, cuando una pareja se divorcia y entre el divorcio y la muerte del esposo hay un período de más de diez (10) años, el ex cónyuge no tiene derecho a una pensión de sobreviviente. Sin embargo, como la ex esposa fue víctima de abuso físico de su ex esposo durante su matrimonio, este período de diez (10) años no se aplica. Como el período de diez (10) años no se aplica cuando hay abusos físicos, la mujer tiene derecho a obtener la pensión de sobreviviente, incluso si se divorció de su esposo antes de la murte. La decisión del Tribunal Superior de Andalucía es reconocer el derecho de la Sra. Ana a una pensión de sobreviviente, incluso si ella ya estaba divorciada cuando su esposo falleció.

Article 237.4 of the Turkish Criminal Code provides for a penalty of two to six month imprisonment if a man or woman holds a religious wedding ceremony before a civil ceremony. Under Turkey’s principle of equality, different individuals with different legal statuses may be treated differently. The Constitutional Court found that the statute does not violate the principle of equality because unmarried individuals have a different legal status than those who have conducted a religious wedding ceremony. In reaching its decision, the Court also noted that legislature has discretionary power to make laws, the Constitution provides for the protection of family life, and the statute does not prohibit religious ceremonies entirely.

The appellant appealed the order of a lower court that he pay maintenance Tshs. 10 000 per month to his former wife. He based his appeal on the claims that his adultery was unfairly held responsible for the dissolution of the marriage and that his income could not sustain the maintenance payments dictated by the lower court. He also argued that his former wife had earned no income during the course of the marriage and thus should not be entitled to a share of the matrimonial assets. The Court dismissed the appeal. It pointed out that his wife had demonstrably objected to his adultery with her niece, noting that this was “sufficient cruelty to break the marriage”. It also noted that theirs had been a Christian marriage, which emphasized fidelity. In addition, the Court also cited the case of Bi Hawa Mohamed, which recognized “housekeeping as services requiring compensation” and the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977, which barred discrimination, to justify the division of matrimonial assets.

The parties, Polish immigrants, divorced in Canada after approximately 25 years of marriage. The wife had a seventh grade education and no special skills or training. During the marriage, in addition to caring for their 3 children and the house, she worked evenings cleaning offices. After the separation, she was awarded custody of the children and received $150 per month spousal and child support and continued to work cleaning offices. The husband remarried in 1984 and continued to pay support to his former wife. She was laid off in 1987 and, as a result of an application to vary, her spousal and child support was increased to $400. She was later able to secure part-time and intermittent cleaning work. In 1989, the husband was granted an order terminating support. The trial judge found that the former wife had had time to become financially independent and that her husband had supported her as long as he could be required to do. The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment and ordered spousal support in the amount of $150 per month for an indefinite period. The matter was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada to determine whether the wife was entitled to ongoing support for an indefinite period of time or whether spousal support should be terminated. The Supreme Court of Canada determined that spousal support should continue and that termination of spousal support, pursuant to sec. 17 of the Divorce Act, should consider the recipient’s disadvantaged economic status as a result of the marriage breakdown both at the time of breakdown and as it may continue, rather than a simple “sink or swim” policy premised on the wife’s having had sufficient time to become self-sufficient. This decision has provided considerable protection from impoverishment for recently divorced women.

The court of first instance decided the divorce of D.B.N. and D.J. on the ground of common fault and placed the minor child in the custody of her father. D.B.N. appealed the decision to the Isai Tribunal, and the appeal court decided to place the minor child in the custody of D.B.N., her mother considering this to be in the best interest of the minor. It explained that the fact that the parents of D.J. were taking care of the minor did not represent sufficient reason for placing her in his custody, as wrongfully held by the court of first instance. The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal of D.J. against the decision of the Iasi Tribunal based on the fact that the minor is attached to her mother and to the domestic violence of her father both against the mother and the minor child.

Court held that divorce obtained by husband under Islamic religious and secular Pakistani law would not be recognized and afforded comity in Maryland. Petitioner argued that because he performed “talaq,” (which under Islamic law, allows a husband to divorce his wife by stating “I divorce thee” three times) the Circuit Court for Montgomery County lacked jurisdiction “to litigate the division of the parties’ marital property.” “The trial court found that the marriage contract entered into on the day of the parties’ marriage in Pakistan specifically did not provide for the division of marital property and thus, for that reason alone, the agreement did not prohibit the Circuit Court for Montgomery County from dividing the parties’ marital property under Maryland law.” The Court of Special Appeals agreed and stated, “[t]hus, the Pakistani marriage contract in the instant matter is not to be equated with a premarital or post-marital agreement that validly relinquished, under Maryland law, rights in marital property.” It explained that the default under Pakistan law is that the wife does not have rights to marital property, while under Maryland law she does. Applying Pakistani law, according to the court, would violate Maryland public policy. The court also noted that a “procedure that permits a man (and him only unless he agrees otherwise) to evade a divorce action begun in this State by rushing to the embassy of a country recognizing talaq and, without prior notice to the wife . . . summarily terminate the marriage and deprive his wife of marital property, confers insufficient due process to his wife. Accordingly, for this additional reason the courts of Maryland shall not recognize the talaq divorce performed here.”

A Supreme Court holding that "although a spouse who has suffered unbearable mistreatment in cohabitation is entitled to sue for divorce, this does not include cases where the other party temporarily loses control and overreacts to the spouse's misconduct" is not unconstitutional. To determine what constitutes "unbearable mistreatment in cohabitation," the courts should take into account the degree of the mistreatment, education levels, social status, and so on, determining if the degree of mistreatment goes beyond the violation of personal dignity and security that would be tolerated by most spouses. Even with regards to cases where a "party temporarily loses control and overreacts to the spouse's misconduct," the precedent does not exclude applying the above factors to determine whether such overreactions threaten the continuity of the marriage.

最高法院認為「雖然配偶得以不堪同居之虐待起訴請求離婚，但這並不包括另一方僅是暫時失去控制或對配偶不當行為作出過度反應的情況」並非違憲。 所謂 「不堪同居之虐待」，法院應考量虐待的程度、教育水平、社會地位等因素，如虐待的程度是否已超出大多數配偶所能容忍對個人尊嚴和安全的侵犯。 即使是關「一方僅是暫時失去控制或對配偶不當行為作出過度反應的情況」，該判例也不排除適用上述因素以決定該過度反應是否威脅婚姻之存續。

The petitioners sued to have several provisions of the Divorce Act declared void on the grounds that they discriminated on the basis of sex. The Court held that sections 4, 5, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 26 of the Divorce Act are void in so far as they discriminate on the basis of gender, so the grounds for divorce as listed are available to both sexes and the compensation for adultery, costs against a co-respondent, alimony, and settlement are applicable to both sexes.

The plaintiff wife sought a decree of divorce on the grounds of the defendant's desertion on the grounds that the defendant abused her and drove her out of the matrimonial home to live with another woman. The Court found that the defendant was previously married through Lesotho customary law to the other woman at the time of the marriage to the plaintiff; thus, the defendant's marriage to the plaintiff was null and void. However, the Court declared that the relationship was a "putative marriage" for the purposes of dividing the plaintiff and defendant's joint property.

The petitioner-wife sought dissolution of her marriage on the grounds of abuse by the respondent-husband, who repeatedly physically abused her and threatened her with physical force when she tried to stop him from drinking. She also asked for maintenance for the couple's daughter. The Court granted the dissolution of marriage and noted that the types of mistreatment the petitioner suffered at the hands of her husband constituted gender-based violence as defined by the Declaration of the Elimination of Violence Against Women because it was based on the unequal power relations between the husband and wife and caused the petitioner serious psychological suffering.

In this divorce proceeding, the court reiterated that in situations in which one of the two parents, most commonly the mother, stays at home and thereby forfeits the opportunity to develop a career and earn a living wage, she is entitled to economic assistance from her husband if the marriage ends. This was especially relevant in this case, given that the husband had previously abused his wife, and after initially leaving him, she was forced to return to the marriage for economic reasons.

En este proceso de divorcio, el tribunal reiteró que en situaciones en las que uno de los dos padres, más comúnmente la madre, se queda en casa y por lo tanto renuncia a la oportunidad de desarrollar una carrera y ganar un salario digno, ella tiene derecho a recibir asistencia económica de parte del marido si el matrimonio termina. Estay ley fue especialmente relevante en este caso, dado que el esposo había abusado previamente de su esposa, y luego de dejarlo inicialmente, se vio obligada a regresar al matrimonio por razones económicas.

Reviewing a trial court decision that granted a divorce based on the actions of both parties, the Appellate Court rejected a husband's suit for divorce, and instead granted the divorce based on the wife's counter suit, holding that the marriage failed due to the husband's domestic abuse of his wife.

Al revisar una decisión del tribunal de primera instancia que otorgó un divorcio basado en las acciones de ambas partes, el Tribunal de Apelación rechazó la demanda de divorcio de un marido y, en su lugar, otorgó el divorcio basado en la demanda de la esposa, sosteniendo que el matrimonio fracasó debido al abuso doméstico del marido hacia su esposa.

The decedent sought to divorce her husband who threatened to kill her and her children if she ever initiated divorce proceedings. In response to the decedent’s numerous reports of assault and dangerous criminal threats, the Austrian police issued an expulsion and prohibition-to-return order against her husband. The police also recommended that her husband be detained, but the Vienna Public Prosecutor twice denied the request. The decedent appealed to the Vienna Intervention Center (“VIC”) after her husband repeatedly came to her workplace to harass and threaten her; the VIC asked the police to pay more attention to the decedent’s case. When the decedent finally filed a petition for divorce at the Vienna District Court of Hernals, her husband followed her home from work and fatally stabbed her. The complaint stated that the State’s action violated Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) because the Austrian criminal justice system negatively impacts women through the public prosecutors’ failure to treat cases of domestic violence seriously. The complaint also stated that the failure of judicial officials and law enforcement to collect data and maintain statistics on domestic violence instances denied the decedent the enjoyment of her human rights in violation of Article 2 and 3 of CEDAW on eliminating laws, regulations, and customs that adversely effect women. Finally, the complaint stated a violation of Article 5 of CEDAW on eliminating social and cultural attitudes towards women in the State’s continual treatment of domestic violence as a social or domestic problem rather than a serious crime. The Committee held that the Austrian police force’s failure to detain the decedent’s estranged husband was in breach of the State’s due diligence obligation to protect the decedent, noting that a perpetrator’s rights cannot superseded women’s human rights to life and to physical and mental integrity. The Committee also took note of the correlation between lenient attitudes towards women’s cultural subordination and domestic violence. Although Austria prosecuted the decedent’s husband to the fullest extent for her death, the Committee found violations of Articles 2 and 3 upon which they recommended that Austria strengthen its implementation and monitoring of the Federal Act for the Prevention against Violence within the Family, and ensure enhanced coordination between police and judicial officers to protect women victims of gender-based violence.

Die Verstorbene wollte sich von ihrem Ehemann scheiden lassen. Dieser drohte ihr, dass er sie und die Kinder umbringen würde, sollte sie jemals ein förmliches Scheidungsverfahren anstrengen. Als Reaktion auf die zahlreichen Anzeigen der Verstorbenen von Übergriffen und gefährlichen Drohungen erließ die österreichische Polizei einen Wohnungsverweis und ein Rückkehrverbot gegen den Ehemann. Die Polizei hat außerdem empfohlen, den Ehemann festzunehmen, allerdings hat die Staatsanwaltschaft Wien dies zweimal zurückgewiesen. Die Verstorbene hat die Wiener Interventionsstelle gegen Gewalt in der Familie („Interventionsstelle“) angerufen, nachdem der Ehemann wiederholt auf ihrer Arbeitsstelle erschien, um sie zu belästigen und zu bedrohen; die Interventionsstelle ersuchte die Polizei, der Angelegenheit um die Verstorbene mehr Aufmerksamkeit zu schenken. Letztlich beantragte die Verstorbene die Scheidung bei dem Bezirksgericht Hernals in Wien. Kurz darauf folgte der Ehemann seiner Frau von der Arbeit nach Hause und erstach sie. Die Beschwerde bringt vor, dass das staatliche Verhalten eine Verletzung von Artikel 1 der UN-Frauenrechtskonvention darstelle. Das Wiener Strafsystem wirkt sich negativ auf Frauen aus, indem die Staatsanwaltschaft versagt, Fälle von häuslicher Gewalt ernst zu nehmen. Weiterhin geht aus der Beschwerde hervor, dass das Unterlassen der Gerichtsbediensteten und Staatsanwaltschaft, Daten zu sammeln, und Statistiken über häusliche Gewalt zu führen, der Verstorbenen das Recht nahm, ihre Menschenrechte wahrzunehmen. Dies stelle eine Verletzung von Artikel 2 und 3 der UN-Frauenrechtskonvention dar, die eine Vernichtung von Gesetzen, Richtlinien und sonstigen Gewohnheiten, die Frauen negativ beeinflussen, verlangen. Zuletzt meinen die Beschwerdeführer, eine Verletzung von Artikel 5 der UN-Frauenrechtskonvention liege vor. Hiernach obliegt dem Staat eine Pflicht, soziale und kulturelle Vorurteile zu überkommen, um häusliche Gewalt gegenüber Frauen als ernstzunehmende Straftat zu erkennen, und nicht weiterhin als rein soziales oder häusliches Problem abzutun. Der Ausschuss stellte fest, dass das Unterlassen der österreichischen Polizei, den Ehemann festzunehmen, die staatliche Schutzpflicht gegenüber der Verstorbenen verletzte. Hierbei betonte er, dass die Rechte des Straftäters nicht schwerer wiegen können als die Menschenrechte der Frau auf Leben und psychische sowie physische Unversehrtheit. Der Ausschuss hat darüber hinaus auf die Korrelation zwischen der kulturellen Unterwerfung einer Frau und häuslicher Gewalt hingewiesen. Obwohl die Staatsanwaltschaft den Ehemann wegen der Tötung der Verstorbenen mit allen rechtlichen Mitteln verfolgte, befand der Ausschuss, dass der Staat seine Pflichten aus Artikel 2 und 3 der UN-Frauenrechtskonvention verletzte. Der Ausschuss empfahl daher, dass Österreich die Durchsetzung und Überwachung der Einhaltung des Bundesgesetzes zum Schutz vor Gewalt in der Familie verbessert, eine verbessere Koordinierung von Polizeiarbeit und Staatsanwaltschaft sicherstellt, um Frauen vor Gewalt zu schützen.

Hibaq Said Hashi left Somalia for fear of persecution by Al-Shabaab. She was divorced from one man and married to a second man, but her former husband claimed they were not divorced and she was having sexual relations with another man, which caused Al-Shabaab to call for her to be stoned. Her father helped her leave Somalia and then he was killed, and her current husband was sentenced to death. She traveled to Italy by boat, was registered and determined she was pregnant, but she faced poor conditions in Italy so she left for Sweden to have her baby. When she learned Swedish authorities planned to send her back to Italy, she and her son moved to Denmark where she applied for asylum. She claimed that if she returned to Somalia she would be persecuted and if she returned to Italy she would face harsh living conditions and would not be able to provide for her son’s basic needs. She was ordered to leave Denmark to return to Italy, which Denmark considered her first country of asylum. Upon appeal, the Committee, acting under article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol, decided that the removal of Hibaq Said Hashi and her son to Italy without any assurances from Italy that it would receive her and her son in conditions suitable for her child’s age and family’s vulnerable status would violate their rights under article 7 of the Covenant. The Committee required Denmark to review her claim in consideration of its obligations under the Covenant and the need to obtain effective assurances from Italy. While considering her request for asylum, the Committee requested that Denmark not deport her and her son.

Applicant is a Romanian citizen who alleged that her husband had been violent towards her and their children on numerous occasions. The assaults intensified when the applicant initiated divorce proceedings against her husband. The applicant’s husband assaulted and threatened her on multiple occasions, for which she required and obtained medical treatment. She then used her medical records as proof when she lodged formal complaints against her husband at the prosecutor’s office. She told prosecutors of the incidences of violence and the fact that her husband repeatedly locked her out of their shared residence. The police did not pursue criminal charges and only imposed an administrative fine, holding that the applicant had provoked the disputes. A similar pattern of abuse, medical attention, and contact with the authorities occurred over a period of months. The applicant brought the case to the European Court of Human Rights alleging that the State “had failed to protect her from domestic violence and to hold the perpetrator accountable.” The Court found that there were violations of Article 3 and Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which forbid torture and discrimination, respectively. The Court found that the authorities were aware of the violence against the applicant, and thus they had an obligation to act on the complaints. The applicant exhausted domestic avenues, but without success. The state’s responses did not comply with international standards about required state action to violence against women and domestic violence. (Available in English, Romanian, and Croatian. English version is official.)

Following divorce and during extended custody proceedings in Bulgaria, B agreed to the father having contact with the child, S. However, he refused B’s contact with S. B recovered S from the kindergarten, which led to the father threatening her and eventually entering her home seeking to recover the child. B moved to a hostel for victims of domestic violence in another town, but the authorities threatened to prosecute her for abduction of S. Despite being asked by B to make an interim order concerning custody of S, the Bulgarian courts failed to do so. In order to avoid prosecution B agreed to care for S with the father in alternate months. S was subject to further violence by the father. She was granted custody of the child eventually, but the father was not prosecuted for his violence, or for subsequent violence against her. The ECtHR found violations of B and S’ right to respect for private and family life under Art 8 of the ECHR. The Court held that the Bulgarian court's failure to adopt interim custody measures without delay had adversely affected the well-being of S and insufficient measures had been taken in reaction to the father's behavior, however, the length of proceedings had not been unreasonable.